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 What is the relationship between evolutionary naturalism and moral realism? More specifically, is 
moral realism compatible with evolutionary naturalism? Moral realism depends on the view that our 
‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable. Considerations from evolutionary science allegedly 
suggest otherwise. Certain evolutionary naturalists employ these considerations in so-called 
‘Evolutionary Debunking’ arguments which show, if sound, that moral realism is unjustified or 
implausible. Evolutionary naturalism, therefore, appears to be incompatible with moral realism. I 
consider this to be a forceful challenge for moral realism. In this dissertation I investigate whether or 
not, or in which sense, the challenge is successful. I argue that (what I call) ‘moral realism 
(traditionally construed)’, a version of moral realism which depends on the epistemic reliability of our 
‘moral intuitions’, is, given evolutionary naturalism and evolutionary science, probably implausible. I 
outline a version of moral realism (‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed)) which does not 
depend on the epistemic reliability of our ‘moral intuitions’. I argue that given evolutionary 
naturalism, evolutionary science, and nativist evolutionary psychology, ‘moral realism’ (non-
traditionally construed) is a naturalized version of moral realism, and is probably compatible with 
evolutionary naturalism. If the outline of ‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed) is plausible, 
then there is a form of moral realism which is compatible with evolutionary naturalism. If it is not 
then ‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is probably implausible given evolutionary naturalism.   
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Introduction 
What is the relationship between evolutionary naturalism and moral realism? More specifically, is 
moral realism compatible with evolutionary naturalism? My overall position is two-fold. I argue that 
what I call ‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is probably not compatible with evolutionary 
naturalism. However, what I call ‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed) probably is.  
Chapters 1-5 are dedicated to establishing the first position, that ‘moral realism’ (traditionally 
construed) is incompatible with evolutionary naturalism. It is only in the final chapter that I present 
considerations in favour of ‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed). Due to limitations in scope, 
all I can present is an outline, or a sketch, of ‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed).  
‘Moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed) is, I argue, plausible (given evolutionary naturalism and 
evolutionary science) on the assumption that some form of moral nativist hypothesis is correct. That 
assumption, however, is not without its controversies, and I do not adequately defend it against those 
controversies. ‘Moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is, I argue, implausible given my take on the 
nature of the traditional moral method, evolutionary science, and evolutionary naturalism.  
‘Moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is probably not compatible with evolutionary naturalism. 
Given evolutionary naturalism and evolutionary science, there are good reasons to regard that thesis 
as implausible. ‘Moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed) is probably compatible with 
evolutionary science and evolutionary naturalism given the moral nativist hypothesis. If moral 
nativism is correct, then there is a naturalized version of moral realism which, of course, is likely 
compatible with evolutionary naturalism. If moral nativism is not correct, then the naturalized version 
of moral realism I propose is not plausible. In this case, given evolutionary naturalism and 
evolutionary science, we must regard ‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed) as probably 
implausible, and must likely adopt some kind of moral anti-realism.  
Two notes are important to make explicit. Firstly, at the end of each chapter I provide a section for my 
‘closing remarks’. These concluding sections summarize the most important details covered in the 
chapter. Secondly, I have opted for a consecutive numbering system for the premises and conclusions 
I discuss in this dissertation. That is, for every new premise I introduce (Pn) n is numbered 
sequentially beginning from 1. The same applies for every new conclusion I introduce (Cn) 
The structure of this dissertation is as follows. 
Chapter 1 established two premises.  
P1. ‘Moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is epistemological and ontological moral realism 
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P2. The ‘moral method’ depends crucially on the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are, in some cases 
and to some degree, ‘epistemically reliable’ 
In establishing these two premises the various technical terms, ‘moral realism’, ‘ontological and 
‘epistemological moral realism’, ‘moral method’, ‘moral intuition’, ‘epistemic reliability’ are defined 
through an analysis of the relevant literature. The point of this chapter is to clarify what is meant by 
the term ‘moral realism’, and to clarify what claims that position relies on.  
Moreover, Chapter 1 provides a more elaborately detailed introduction than can be given here. There I 
explain what is meant by the various technical terms I employ, and how this relates to my overall 
position. Most of the chapter is dedicated to establishing P2, as such, most of the chapter is dedicated 
to discussing the methodologies employed to justify moral realist claims.  
Chapter 2 establishes four claims. The first two claims are about what to make of the notion of 
‘naturalism’ and ‘evolutionary naturalism’. By surveying the literature I show that there is no robust 
definition of these terms on offer.  
I then, thirdly, clarify how I will be using the terms. Particularly a ‘naturalist’ will allow scientific 
data to underwrite his/her philosophical views where possible. Where this is not possible, a naturalist 
will seek to render his/her philosophical views compatible with that data. Further, a naturalist will 
reject perspectives which cannot reasonably fit into a broadly scientific worldview. I argue that 
‘evolutionary naturalism’ is a particular kind of naturalism. As such an ‘evolutionary naturalist’ will 
act similarly with regards to the data of evolutionary science regarding matters about human beings or 
human affairs.  
Respectively, those three claims are P3, P4 and P5. The significant claim which I defend is: 
P6. Evolutionary science has relevance for our understanding of the nature of our moral capacities 
(read: ‘moral intuitions’).  
By implication, I argue, evolutionary science has relevance for our ethical and metaethical views.  
I do not satisfactorily establish P6 here. I leave that task to Chapter 3. What I succeed in establishing 
is a conditional claim: 
P6*. If evolutionary theory can be applied to matters of psychology then evolutionary science has 
relevance for our understanding of the nature of our moral capacities (read: ‘moral intuitions’). 
The point of this chapter is to clarify how I use the terms ‘naturalism’ and ‘evolutionary naturalism’. 
It is also to motivate the relevance of evolutionary science for our ethical and metaethical views. 
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Conditional on P6*, I show that, even if one does not endorse ‘evolutionary naturalism’ one still 
should take seriously the relevant data from evolutionary science.  
Chapter 3 takes up three tasks. Firstly, I justify P6 from Chapter 2. I do this first by justifying the 
proposition that evolutionary theory can be applied to the matter of our psychology. I continue, then, 
to motivate what I discussed in Chapter 1, regarding the nature of our ‘moral intuitions’. This is that 
our ‘moral intuitions’ are essentially psychological. Our moral capacities (including our capacity for 
‘moral intuition’) form a part of our psychology, itself a feature of our social capacities. This is 
sufficient to justify P6.  
Secondly, I briefly assess two problems with the nativist hypothesis endorsed by the evolutionary 
psychology I have reviewed. I argue that despite these problems we are still justified in endorsing the 
nativist hypothesis.  
Thirdly, I end off by spelling out the implications many have believed evolutionary science in fact has 
for moral realism. This is that evolutionary science shows us that our ‘moral intuitions’ are not, in any 
cases, to any degree, ‘epistemically reliable’. In conjunction with P2 (Chapter 1) this suggests that 
evolutionary science provides us with reasons to reject moral realism. I only sketch this problem; I 
deal with it in more detail in Chapter 4 by assessing various ‘evolutionary debunking’ arguments.  
Chapter 4 details and critiques the ‘evolutionary debunking’ arguments. I assess 4 different 
arguments, 3 of which I judge to be unsuccessful. After discussing the fourth, successful, argument, I 
conclude that evolutionary science, in conjunction with evolutionary naturalism, renders ‘moral 
realism’ (traditionally construed) implausible. As such, I think that we have some plausible reasons in 
favour of moral anti-realism. 
The first three arguments under review are not altogether well-formed in the literature. Scholars are 
sometimes unclear whether they intend one or another, or a combination, of the arguments I discuss. 
As such, the arguments I present are somewhat idealized forms of arguments presented in the 
literature.  
Chapter 5 critically assess various objections to the allegedly successful anti-realist argument 
(Argument 4) presented in Chapter 4. I Begin by considering what I believe to be an implausible 
objection which rejects evolutionary naturalism. I argue that it is not successful. 
I continue then to assess three apparently distinct objections, which might seem on the surface to be 
more promising. I argue that they are not really distinct, and each is unsuccessful because, in their 
own ways, they beg the question against the anti-realist.  
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This, I argue, is the result of a more general problem. The anti-realist argument I have endorsed is, in 
a general sense, an attack against the very methodology (the ‘moral method’) employed by moral 
realists. Because it is the methodology of moral realists which is in question, it is inappropriate to 
argue in support of that methodology by presupposing its correctness. However this is what each 
argument does, in its own way. As such, I find them also to be unsuccessful. I conclude that endorsing 
evolutionary naturalism in conjunction with evolutionary science does provide one with good reasons 
to reject moral realism in favour of moral anti-realism.   
Chapter 6 tries to defend moral realism against the anti-realist arguments presented in Chapter 4. The 
considerations there assume that some kind of ‘moral nativist’ hypothesis is correct. I try to defend 
moral realism by doing two things. Firstly I present an argument against P16 (probably our ‘moral 
intuitions’ are not, to any degree, in any cases, epistemically reliable) (established in Chapter 4). I 
suggest that we do not have warrant to accept that our ‘moral intuitions’ are not epistemically reliable 
(i.e. that they are non-truth-tracking). I intend this to be a skeptical challenge to P16. I suggest that 
since there is no independently acceptable account of ‘moral truth’ there is no sense in suggesting 
ether that our ‘moral intuitions’ do or do not track ‘moral truth’.   
Secondly, to solve this skeptical problem I offer a distinct kind of moral methodology. I argue that 
with this distinct methodology we may conclude that our ‘moral intuitions’ do track moral truths of a 
special kind. This is sufficient for the ‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed) I noted in Chapter 
1. ‘Moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed) will not rely on the ‘moral method’. I suspect most 
traditional moral realists would not readily endorse this view. So I thereafter sketch what I think is at 
issue, and how the issue could be decided. Because scope does not allow me to go into much detail, I 
leave the proposal of this new method as an important theoretical consideration which only further 
research could confirm or disconfirm.  
I close off by noting that if this proposed methodology is workable, then ‘moral realism’ (sans the 
‘moral method’) is compatible with and underwritten by evolutionary science. If the proposed 
methodology is not workable it is because one or another anti-realist position on ‘moral truth’ is 
correct, or because moral nativism is unacceptable. In either case evolutionary science may render 
anti-realism (as argued for in Chapter 4) plausible.  
The Conclusion spells out formally what the implications of my investigations are. I assess what to 
make of my two-fold position on the relationship between evolutionary naturalism and moral realism. 
I do this by assessing Argument 4 and my arguments against two of its central premises (P16 and 
P18) from which I make my proposals about ‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed). I spell out 
the logical implications of the various positions I’ve assessed highlighting the necessary conditions 
for my two-fold position. I thereafter say a few more words in defence of ‘moral realism’ (non-
traditionally construed) in order to make the view more acceptable, given moral nativism.  
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Chapter 1 
Moral Realism and Moral Methodology 
Section 1: Introduction 
This chapter is about understanding what ‘moral realism’ is. I am not speaking about all forms of 
‘moral realism’. My focus pertains to ‘moral realism’ as it has been understood since Moore and 
Ross. It is that broad view which I call ‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed). As such, although my 
arguments may have implications for, say, Platonic moral realism, or a Platonic moral realist may 
have Platonic objections to my position, it is not my intention to focus on those issues.  
My overall position can be summed up as follows. I think that ‘moral realism’ (traditionally 
construed) is rendered implausible by the conjunction of evolutionary naturalism and evolutionary 
science. I will argue that ‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed) avoids such problems and 
could be plausible even in conjunction with evolutionary naturalism and evolutionary science.  
Certain notions stand in need of definition if one is to make sense of the position I take. This chapter 
concerns itself with understanding the notion of ‘moral realism’ as it features in the overall argument. 
There are three questions which will be answered in this chapter. Firstly, which features comprise 
‘moral realism’? Secondly, how is ‘moral realism’ traditionally justified? Answering these questions 
is important for two reasons. One is that it allows us to make sense of the anti-realist view that ‘moral 
realism’ (traditionally construed) is implausible. We can say with precision that some claims which 
comprise moral realism are made implausible by considerations of evolutionary naturalism and 
evolutionary science. Or, otherwise, that ‘moral realism’ cannot be traditionally justified. The other is 
that it allows us to make sense of the view that some non-traditional form of moral realism (including 
some non-traditional justification for it) is compatible with evolutionary science and evolutionary 
naturalism.  
Now, there are two central premises which this chapter wishes to defend. One premise, less 
controversial, is this. There are four main features of ‘moral realism’ which can be categorized under 
two subheadings which denote different moral realist theses.  
The four main claims of moral realism are: 
1. There are moral facts 
2. These facts are objective.  
3. We have epistemic access to these facts. 
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4. Access is gained through the use of the ‘moral method’ 
These features can be categorized under two subheadings: ‘epistemological moral realism’ and 
‘ontological moral realism’. The ontological thesis comprises of claims 1 and 2. The epistemological 
thesis comprises of claims 3 and 4.  
Moral realism (traditionally construed) is the conjunction of ‘epistemological’ and ‘ontological’ moral 
realism. Moral realism (non-traditionally construed) is the same except that it will not include feature 
4, since ‘the moral method’ (a central feature of traditional moral realism) will be abandoned.  
There is some sense in which ontological and epistemological moral realism are logically distinct. 
Suggesting, then, that ‘moral realism’ is the thesis which expresses their conjunction requires some 
defence. My defence, on which I will elaborate in this chapter (and then again in Chapter 4) is that 
ontological moral realism is motivated principally by the more detailed features of epistemological 
moral realism. Without epistemological moral realism, it is not simply that ontological moral realism 
stands unjustified (since we have, then, no reason to believe that there are moral facts). Rather it is 
that the entire motivation for ontological moral realism is undermined.  
An analogy for now will suffice to make the point. Suppose that there was some religion, Religion X 
the truth of which entailed some proposition P. Suppose that it was justified by the belief that Book Y 
was divinely inspired. Since Book Y is the work of some divine force, and Book Y tells us that 
Religion X is correct, then P.  
Finding out, then, that Book Y was written by a fraud, that none of it is true but just the fantasy of this 
fraud, not only takes away justification for believing in Religion X. It takes away all ground for 
supposing that Religion X is likely to be true at all. Most probably, Religion X is false, and probably 
P (principally motivated by Religion X, on the view that Book Y was divinely inspired) is false too.  
That is not a logical entailment of the falsity of Book Y, but given the relationship between belief in 
Book Y and the proposition that P, discovery that Book Y was false motivates (even if it doesn’t 
entail) the rejection of proposition P. This is the relationship, I argue, which exists between 
ontological and epistemological moral realism. There is no entailment from the falsity of 
epistemological moral realism to the falsity of ontological moral realism. But finding the former to be 
false strongly suggests, because of their relationship, that the latter is false as well. At most one can 
hold out for ontological moral realism, but in doing so hold out for it for no available reason at all.  
The first premise which I defend in this chapter, then, is this: ‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed) 
is epistemological and ontological moral realism. This allows us to make sense of arguments, dealt 
with in later chapters, which conclude that ‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is false, and it 
9 
 
helps us to assess those arguments. It also provides us with conditions for my further contention that 
‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed) can be defended.  
The second premise I defend in this chapter is that the method used by traditional moral realists to 
gain moral knowledge is one which relies on the truth of the proposition that our ‘moral intuitions’ 
are, in some cases, and to some degree, ‘epistemically reliable’. That is, the ‘moral method’ depends 
crucially on the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are, in some cases, and to some degree, 
‘epistemically reliable’.  
By ‘epistemically reliable’ I mean that they are in some sense, to some degree, in some cases, 
‘evidence’ of ‘moral truth’. I intend this to parallel the way we view our empirical observations as 
they relate to claims about the external world. How, or in which ways, this is evidence is an 
epistemological concern I do not take up. My focus is simply on the view that ‘moral intuitions’ 
provide some kind of evidentiary support for our moral claims. 
This is controversial for the following reason. Within the literature under review, moral philosophers 
are not explicit about the nature of their methodology. Some are called “Intuitionists”, others 
“Reflective Equilibrium Theorists”, others “Cornell Moral Realists”. Each group believes themselves 
to have a fundamentally different moral methodology to the other. Perhaps, in certain senses they do. 
It is not, however, my aim to argue that they employ different methodologies. Nor is it my claim to 
argue that the different methodologies are reducible to essentially the same methodology. My claim, 
for which I argue, is that each methodology, whatever other differences there may be, relies on the 
view that our ‘moral intuitions’, to some or other degree, in some cases, are ‘epistemically reliable’. 
This formulation might seem vague, but it is, I think, all that is necessary for the contentions of this 
dissertation. As an analogy, take the basic empiricist credo that whatever knowledge there is derives 
from sense experience. That can be reformulated to the claim that our sense experience, to some 
degree and in some cases, is epistemically reliable. Empiricists might qualify this claim differently. 
Some will take up the view that observations are theory-laden, others will insist that there can be pure 
observations from which we can develop a purely phenomenalistic language of ‘sense-data’. Others, 
causal realists, say, will suggest that our sense experiences alone cannot justify all there is to the 
world. Others, regularity theorists, say, will deny that.  
This variety is the analogue of the variety found among moral realists. It is a variety which is 
irrelevant for my purposes. I wish to focus on the central claim that our sense experience is 
epistemically reliable. Analogously, that is, regarding moral realism, I wish to focus on the central 
claim that our ‘moral intuitions’ are, to some degree, in some cases, epistemically reliable.  
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It is important to get clear on what a ‘moral intuition’ is. However, the literature under review is not 
clear on that matter. I believe that there is no precise formulation of it. I will do two things. I will first 
demonstrate, with the use of examples, that the literature under review in fact does not provide any 
precise definition of ‘moral intuition’. I will then spell out how I am using the notion. I believe that 
the manner in which I use the notion captures the important features from the variety of uses it enjoys 
in the literature.  
Tännsjö calls them“basic” or “foundational” moral judgments and intuitions (Tännsjö 1989, 10). 
Moore referred to them simply as “intuitions” which he took to be ‘self-evident’ moral truths (Moore 
2004, 85). Ross says that ‘intuitions’ allow us to formulate moral judgment which, by ‘reflection’ 
(Ross 2004, 91), are apprehended as self-evidently true (Ross 2004, 89). He later refers to our “moral 
convictions” (presumably our moral judgments) as “The verdicts of the moral consciousness […] 
(Ross 2004, 96)” 
Horgan et al suggest more vaguely that our metaethical theorizing involves the consideration of the 
“deeply embedded aspects of moral thought and moral discourse […] (Horgan et al 2006, 223).” 
Kerstein suggests that our ethical and metaethical theories may be decided on the basis of our 
“ordinary moral thinking” and “widespread [moral] judgment” (Kerstein 2006, 129). FitzPatrick 
suggests, rather, that our ethical and metaethical theories may be decided by our “First order ethical 
experience and understanding (FitzPatrick 2013, 4).”  
Richards thinks that the justification for moral values involves appeal to, and ultimately reliance upon, 
“common sense moral judgments (Richards 1986, 284)”. Daniels believes that intuitionists (like Ross 
and Moore) take our moral judgments and intuitions to be “basic” or “self-warranting” (Daniels 1979, 
264). Boyd thinks that our moral intuitions and judgments play an epistemic role in our moral 
theories, and are precisely analogous to the role played by empirical observations in scientific theories 
(Boyd 1988, 184).  
Evolutionary psychologists, who seek to explain our moral capacities, describe our capacities for 
moral thought in various ways. It may be described as a ‘moral sense’ or a ‘moral instinct’ (Ruse 
2010, 307). It may be referred to as ‘conscience’ or ‘social instinct’ (Thompson 1999, 475). Other 
times this is referred to as ‘intuitions’ (described by Greene as ‘gut feelings’ – emotive responses, 
rather than bona fide propositional attitudes) (Greene 2003, 847). These are even sometimes described 
as ‘evolved moral intuitions’ (Ruse 2010, 310) 
There is clearly an immense variety of labels used throughout the literature. Unfortunately what the 
labels are supposed to denote is never spelled out. One can gather, to some degree, what is intended 
by analyzing the context in which these labels feature. Familiarity with the literature may act as a 
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bulwark against bafflement. But that won’t do for my purposes here. Let me then say how I will be 
using the term. My own definition is also vague, but it is workable.  
I take ‘moral intuitions’ to be akin to ‘empirical observations’. In that, I am following Boyd. As such, 
I think that ‘moral intuitions’ play some evidentiary role in our moral theorizing. I believe them to be 
the result of our psychological and cognitive capacities.  
‘Moral intuitions’ help us to form ‘moral judgments’ and so to make ‘moral claims’. A judgment, or a 
claim, is propositional – it may be true or false. Our ‘moral intuitions’ count as evidence, of some 
kind, to some degree, in some cases, for our ‘moral judgments’ and ‘moral claims’. Insofar as moral 
theories help us to generate moral judgments and claims, ‘moral intuitions’ may play an evidentiary 
role for moral theories as well.  
‘Moral intuitions’ might or might not be propositional themselves. Greene refers to them as ‘gut-
feelings’, Richards refers to them as ‘common sense’. Both renditions are metaphorical. Both 
renditions serve to indicate the immediacy of the recognition of the truth of some proposition. Our 
‘gut-feelings’ (that ‘pang of guilt’ one feels after doing someone wrong, say) can, at least, be 
rationalized cognitively so that they come to represent, or bear some relation to, some moral 
propositional attitude. ‘Gut feelings’ are more emotionally based responses, our ‘common sense’ is 
more cognitive. Both nevertheless play a similar role in the formation of our moral judgments. 
Emotive responses, and cognitive rationalizations, as I see it here, are two extremes on a continuum. 
Both nodes on that continuum, and what lies in between, can be considered ‘moral intuitions’. 
What is important here is the following. What I refer to as ‘moral intuitions’ is an idealization of the 
various uses to which the notion is put throughout the literature. My formulation captures, I think, the 
most important features of ‘moral intuitions’, features with which all moral realists could agree. 
Further, it leaves space for debate about more particular questions, such as their fallibility, or the 
nature of the support they provide for our moral judgments.  
The important features of ‘moral intuitions’ are the following. They are part of our psychological 
capacities – they are mental capacities which we have in virtue of our brains. They are propositional 
(‘common sense’), or quasi-propositional (‘gut-feelings’). They play an evidentiary role, to some 
degree, in some cases, for our moral judgments and our moral theories. Moral realists believe that 
they are, to some degree in some cases epistemically reliable, and moral anti-realists do not. That is: 
moral realists believe that they are, to some degree, in some cases, evidence of an objective moral 
reality; and anti-realists do not
1
.  
                                                          
1
 Anti-realists, nevertheless, may admit that our ‘moral intuitions’ play an evidentiary role for our moral 
judgments, and moral theories (non-realistically construed). They just contend that neither our ‘moral intuitions’ 
nor our moral judgments are not about any objective moral reality. 
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I think that moral realists believe our ‘moral intuitions’ to be, to some degree, in some cases, 
epistemically reliable. I say, “to some degree” because different moral theorists have imbued our 
‘moral intuitions’ with different degrees of epistemic reliability. Earlier moral realists believed our 
‘moral intuitions’ to be infallible guides to moral truth. More contemporary moral realists are 
fallibilists about our ‘moral intuitions’ I wish to defend neither view, and I only wish to focus on what 
is common between them. They both regard our ‘moral intuitions’ as epistemically reliable. 
I say, “in some cases” because, obviously, no moral realist believes our ‘moral intuitions’ to be 
epistemically reliable in all cases. Even the early infallibilist moral realists realized that we may 
sometimes be in error about (in their view) the ‘real’ content of our ‘moral intuitions’. The fact is that 
moral disagreements occur very frequently where both disputants believe themselves to be intuitively 
justified. Regarding such cases a moral realist believes that one of them is correct. Clearly, therefore, 
the moral realist cannot believe that our ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable in all cases since 
one of the disputants who has some ‘moral intuitions’ is wrong.  
The formulation “to some degree, in some cases” leaves open the further controversy of whether or 
not there is anything more to moral theorizing than clarifying our ‘moral intuitions’. Most moral 
realists believe that we must theorize about morality while keeping in mind our other theoretical 
commitments. Surely, in some sense, this is unavoidable. Theorizing about whether or not it is right to 
apply cyanide to some persons drink, say, depends on having in mind some further information about 
what exactly cyanide is. Again, I am not concerned to support a position on the precise nature of 
moral theorizing. My concern relates to the view that our ‘moral intuitions’, to some degree, in some 
cases, are epistemically reliable.  
Thus, the two premises which this chapter defends are as follows. 
P1. ‘Moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is epistemological and ontological moral realism 
P2. The ‘moral method’ depends crucially on the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are, in some cases, 
and to some degree, ‘epistemically reliable’ 
Section 2: Ontological Moral Realism 
Ontological moral realism is the thesis that (1) there are moral facts and (2) these facts are objective. 
(1) is related to a particular view about the function of moral language. Moral realism involves two 
noteworthy semantic features of moral language. Moral language is propositional and normative. To 
say that moral language is propositional is to say that upon uttering some moral sentence we are 
uttering a sentence which could be true or false (Tännsjö 1989, 1).  
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Moral language is normative in the sense that it is evaluative and action-guiding. It is evaluative in 
that it makes claims about what things, actions or events are better or worse than others. It is action-
guiding in that moral language indicates how one ought to act, or behave, or which actions or events 
ought to occur (Railton 2006, 201).  
Now, two conditions need to be met in order for there to be moral facts; as such, the moral realist is 
committed to the view that the following two conditions obtain (Rea 2006, 1). Firstly, there are moral 
properties (such as ‘goodness’, ‘badness’, ‘being a good action’, etc.) which are instantiated at least 
by some actual objects, actions or events. Secondly, that these properties are be mind-independent and 
theory-independent.  
It is the second of these two conditions which implies the moral realist commitment to the objectivity 
of moral facts. Moral facts are objective because the actuality of the instantiation of particular moral 
properties is theory and mind independent (Jacobs 2002, 1), (Horgan et al 2006, 224). Put differently, 
the truth of a moral sentence does not depend on anyone’s acceptance of its truth. Moral sentences are 
rendered true or false, respectively, by their correspondence to or failure of correspondence with the 
moral facts. 
Moral realism, then, is committed to the view that our moral language is propositional, and that our 
moral sentences are for that reason capable of being true or false. It holds that the truth or falsity of a 
moral sentence is determined by its concord or discord with moral facts. That there are such moral 
facts implies that there are actually instantiated moral properties resident in at least some objects, 
events or actions. That such instantiation occurs is not a matter which depends on our beliefs, desires, 
intentions or theories – it is not subjective, in that sense. Rather, the instantiation of such properties is 
a mind and theory independent matter. As such, the moral realist is committed to the existence of 
objective moral facts. A moral claim is made objectively true or false by corresponding to, or failing 
to correspond with, the objective moral facts.  
Section 3: Epistemic Access to Moral Facts and The Moral Method – A Brief History 
It is a well subscribed to feature of moral realism that we are capable of obtaining moral knowledge – 
and so that we have some epistemic access to moral facts (see (Moore 2004, 84), (Ross 2004, 89) and 
(Tännsjö 1989, 9)).  I consider that claim (feature 3 of ‘moral realism’) to be uncontroversial for 
moral realists. What is more interesting is the method by which such moral knowledge is obtained. 
Moral knowledge is generated by the ‘moral method’ – the analogue, for ethics, of the ‘scientific 
method’.  Essentially the moral method employs our ‘moral intuitions’ as data, from which it 
generates more elaborate (moral) ‘theories’ and general (moral) ‘principles’ (Tännsjö 1989, 10).  
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As I indicated earlier, the precise nature of this data is not my concern. Some early moral realists took 
this data to be certain guides to moral truth, later moral realists are less confident about them. What is 
important for my position is just that the moral method depends on the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ 
are, to some degree, and in some sense, epistemically reliable.  
The idea can be traced back to the writings of G. E. Moore (Moore 2004, 85) and W. D. Ross (Ross 
2004, 89). Moore believed that moral questions (for example, ‘what sort of thing is good?’) are 
answered with reference to what he called our ‘intuitions’ (Moore 2004, 85). He believed that these 
intuitions represent self-evident moral truth. That is, whatever, upon reflection, we come to regard as 
self-evidently, or obviously, good is the deliverance of a moral intuition and is, as such, good (Moore 
2004, 84). Ross affirms a similar view which he called ‘ethical intuitionism’. It denotes at least the 
following three claims. (1) Moral truths are (at least in part) epistemically accessible. (2) Our mode of 
access to these moral truths is through our ‘intuitions’.  And (3) the deliverance of our intuitions are 
appreciable as ‘self-evident’ truths; alternatively, our set of moral intuitions are identical with the set 
of self-evident moral truths (Ross 2004, 89). 
Ross and Moore can be seen as setting out the foundations of a particular research program within 
moral philosophy. It is a program in which moral theories are confirmable on the basis of whether or 
not they capture our ‘moral intuitions’. Put simply, a good theory will be a theory which does 
sufficient justice to our ‘moral intuitions’ (Ross 2004, 89).  
More contemporary moral theorists no longer seem to believe that our ‘moral intuitions’ are certain 
guides to moral truths. ‘Moral intuitions’ are more like pieces of evidence. They are data which may 
produce (fallible) support for certain moral beliefs and moral theories. Theorists nevertheless 
ordinarily recognize the centrality of ‘moral intuitions’ to our theories. This can be brought out by 
briefly considering the following cases.  
Among other criteria for a successful metaethical theory, for example, is the criterion that our 
metaethical theories must account for as many of our “deeply embedded aspects of moral thought and 
moral discourse … as possible” (Horgan et al 2006, 223). The notion of ‘embedded aspects of moral 
thought’ plays precisely the same role, even if it is slightly vaguer, as Ross’s ‘intuitions’. The measure 
of a metaethical theory, just as a normative ethical theory, will depend on how well it coheres with 
our ‘moral intuitions’.  
As another example consider the chapter in Dreier’s book (Kerstein 2006) which details Kerstein’s 
argument against what is called a ‘sentimentalist’ moral theory in favour of a broadly Kantian moral 
theory. The details are unimportant here. Kerstein’s method is to show that a sentimentalist moral 
theory has implications which, “clashes with ordinary moral thinking in ways that a Kantian account 
does not (emphasis added) (Kerstein 2006, 129)”.  
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The notion of our ‘ordinary moral thinking’ takes the place of Ross and Moore’s intuitions, but they 
play roughly the same role. This is a case in which one moral theory is selected in favour of a distinct 
moral theory because the former coheres better with some set of ‘moral intuitions’.  
I want to draw out the following implications. Historically and contemporarily our ‘moral intuitions’ 
are used as crucial pieces of evidence in favour of our ethical and metaethical perspectives. The 
significance of ‘moral intuitions’ has changed through history. Ross and Moore believed them to be 
certain guides to moral truth, contemporary figures no longer do. That change is unimportant. What is 
important is that for moral realists ‘moral intuitions’ to some degree, in some cases, are epistemically 
reliable. They play the role of data, evidence which can be marshalled in favour of some ethical or 
metaethical perspective.  
I may drive the point home with the following elaborate quotation from Ross.  
“The moral convictions of thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of ethics just as sense-
perceptions are the data of natural science. Just as some of the latter have to be rejected as illusory, 
so have some of the former; but as the latter are rejected only when they conflict with other more 
accurate sense perceptions, the former are rejected only when they conflict with other convictions 
which stand better the test of reflection. The moral convictions of the best people is the cumulative 
product of the moral reflections of many generations; and this the theory should treat with the greatest 
respect. The verdicts of the moral consciousness of the best people are the foundations on which he 
must build; though he must first compare them with one another and eliminate any contradictions they 
may contain (emphasis added) (Ross 2004, 96).” 
While there are certain superficial differences between Ross’ conception and those of contemporary 
theorists, there are broad and important similarities. The passage states that moral theory is akin to 
scientific theory. While the data of science are empirical observations, the data of moral theory are 
‘moral intuitions’. The test of a moral theory is whether or not – or to which degree – it comports with 
our ‘moral intuitions’. The test of our ‘moral intuitions’ is whether or not they can withstand rational 
scrutiny and further ‘reflection’. Implicit in all this must be the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are 
epistemically reliable to some degree and in some cases.  
The above is an elaboration of the third and fourth features of ‘moral realism’ I had earlier mentioned. 
Not only are there objective moral facts, but we do have some access to them, and our access to them 
is best achieved through the moral method. I have provided some history to the program of moral 
realists. I have also provided some motivation to think that contemporary moral theorists are still 
committed to this program if only because they continue to view our ‘moral intuitions’, to some 
degree, in some cases, as epistemically reliable.  
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Section 4: Intuitionism and Wide Reflective Equilibrium 
The view which I have described above is normally referred to as ‘Intuitionism’. Some moral 
philosophers would disagree that the moral method is nothing more than ‘intuitionism’. They suggest, 
instead, that the method of ‘wide reflective equilibrium’ is employed, and that this is distinct from 
Intuitionism. Let me turn now to assess this issue.  
What I will argue is not that ‘wide reflective equilibrium’ is reducible to ‘intuitionism’. I am willing 
to concede that there are some significant differences between the two models. What I will argue is 
that intuitionism and wide reflective equilibrium, insofar as they are utilized by moral realists, both 
regard our ‘moral intuitions’ as epistemically reliable in some cases and to some degree.  Whatever 
other distinctions there are between the two views at least they have this in common, and this is all I 
wish to defend.  
Daniels suggests that ‘intuitionism’ is a ‘two-tiered view’ of moral theory choice and justification 
(Daniels 1979, 256). One critic suggests that unless adherents of the two-tiered view grant 
‘epistemological privilege’ to our ‘moral intuitions’, then this view cannot secure the implications that 
our moral theories reflect moral truths (Daniels 1979, 256).  
For ‘moral intuitions’ to have ‘epistemological privilege’ is for them not merely to be guides, or 
indications, to moral truth, however fallible. Rather it is for them, in some sense, to be ‘basic’ or ‘self-
warranting’ (Daniels 1979, 264). That is, adherents of the two-tiered view must, according to this 
critic, regard the deliverance of our ‘moral intuitions’ as being identical with or entailing certain 
moral truths.  
This, it turns out, is the focus of the distinction between intuitionism and the method of ‘wide 
reflective equilibrium’. The former, but not the latter, it is claimed, grants this particular 
‘epistemological privilege’ (read: epistemological certainty) to our ‘moral intuitions’ (Daniels 1979, 
264).  
The method of ‘wide reflective equilibrium’ is taken as a more favourable and fundamentally distinct 
methodology for moral theorizing (Daniels 1979, 257). The ‘two-tiered method’ can be seen as an 
attempt to glean general moral principles from particular ‘moral intuitions’, the accuracy of the former 
being transitive from the latter. Wide reflective equilibrium, on the other hand, attempts to create 
coherence between three distinct things. Firstly, a set of considered moral judgments, secondly, a set 
of moral principles and thirdly a set of relevant background theories (Daniels 1979, 258). 
There are 4 distinct stages of the process of reflective equilibrium (Daniels 1979, 258f). If we 
compare this to the program outlined by Ross, we will find that Ross’s method is rather simplistic in 
comparison. So, regarding wide reflective equilibrium, firstly a person begins by collecting a set of 
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moral judgments. Those judgments which are not held confidently, or which were generated under 
conditions prone to error are filtered out. Second: different moral principles, with varying ‘degrees of 
‘fit’’ to the moral judgments are proposed and considered.  
Third: arguments are marshalled for and against the various moral principles; these arguments are 
inferences from some set of relevant background theories. The goal of these arguments is to 
determine not only which moral principles have the best ‘fit’ with our moral judgments, but also 
which moral principles have the best fit with our overall picture (delineated by our background 
theories) of the world. Fourth: the moral agent works through each stage over again, making 
appropriate alterations to his set of moral judgments, or moral principles, or background theories, until 
the total set reaches a justified coherence. At that point the agent has reached the equilibrium point 
between his moral judgments, principles, and his background theories.  
More detail can be given regarding the workings of the method of wide reflective equilibrium (see 
(Daniels 1979, 259-264)). Details aside, let me highlight some important features. On this model the 
justification of a moral claim is not solely the degree to which it coheres with our ‘moral intuitions’. 
Further considerations are necessary in order to consider the plausibility of a moral principle.  
Now, the same sort of revision to moral principles is also possible regarding our background theories 
and our considered moral judgments. Nothing, on this view, is necessarily ‘fixed’. The goal, in 
reflective equilibrium, is not to construct principles which cohere with (fixed) ‘moral intuitions’ and 
background theories. The goal rather is to dynamically assess each our intuitions, principles, and 
background considerations. In pitting one against the other by employing different arguments, to 
different effects, one can, in the end, draw conclusions which reflect a coherent set of the three. An 
important feature of this model is that our ‘moral intuitions’ themselves, even those in which we are 
confident, can be revised.  
As I have said, my main concern here is whether or not this model still requires that our ‘moral 
intuitions’ (if we wish to maintain some kind of moral realism) be epistemically reliable, to some 
degree, in some cases? If this model still requires that feature then, for my concerns, wide reflective 
equilibrium is not importantly different from intuitionism.  
Now, Daniels maintains that reflective equilibrium is not a disguised or complex intuitionism. His 
main reason for this view is the following. ‘Intuitionism’ involves a kind of foundationalism in which 
‘moral intuitions’ are given ‘epistemological privilege’. Wide reflective equilibrium does not regard 
our ‘moral intuitions’ in this manner. Every moral judgment, every ‘moral intuition’, including our 
considered ones, which we hold with confidence, generated from conditions which are not error 
prone, is revisable. Intuitionism, but not wide reflective equilibrium, is foundationalist, and it is in this 
sense that the author believes them to be distinct (Daniels 1979, 266).  
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This is not disagreeable. Moore and Ross, for instance, can be construed as intuitionists in this strong 
sense. This is not what is at issue. ‘Moral intuitions’, on both accounts, are epistemically relevant. 
That is, on both accounts our ‘moral intuitions’ serve as pieces of evidence, or data, with which to 
generate our moral theories. Some strong intuitionists, like Moore, might think that our intuitions are 
the only relevant data, and that the set of ‘moral intuitions’ logically entails some or other moral 
theory. Others might think that ‘moral intuitions’ in conjunction with other considerations (those held 
important by wide reflective equilibrium theorists) provide fallible support for some or other moral 
theory. Both grant our ‘moral intuitions’ epistemic relevance. That is, both view our ‘moral intuitions’ 
as epistemically reliable, to some degree, in some cases. Further, probably, neither could recognize as 
plausible any moral theory which was entirely unintuitive.  
Now, in the strictest sense, wide reflective equilibrium does not represent a foundationalist view of 
moral theorizing. In this sense it is distinct from intuitionism, as construed by Daniels. It is possible, 
however, to view wide reflective equilibrium and intuitionism as on a continuum, divided in gradients 
by the degree of ‘epistemic privilege’ granted to ‘moral intuitions’. Both models reside on this 
continuum. Perhaps they can be further distinguished by which other features or methods they 
consider to be relevant. For my purposes, then, they are not importantly distinct because both rely on 
the view that our ‘moral intuitions’, to some degree, in some cases, are epistemically reliable.  
Section 5: Contemporary Justifications of Moral Realism 
I believe that I have so far shown the plausibility of P1. I do not feel, however, that I have sufficiently 
motivated P2. I have given a broad look at some of the history of moral realist thought. I think, from 
that, it is clear that our ‘moral intuitions’ play the crucial role I say they do. I will now try to make the 
case for P2 stronger. I will do this by assessing two methods by which moral realism can be justified. 
The point of this is to further motivate the view that one of the central features of the moral method is 
that our ‘moral intuitions’ are, to some degree, in some cases, epistemically reliable.  
There appears to be two broad methods by which moral realists justify their realism (Tropman 2008, 
167). One method involves the attempt to find coherence between ‘moral intuitions’ about morality 
and our philosophical metaethical accounts. Another attempt is to justify moral realism along 
analogues lines of reasoning to those which attempt to justify scientific realism. 
The first method is something which has already been mentioned: the “phenomenological criterion” 
for guiding metaethical theorizing (Horgan et al 2006, 223). The criterion is that “a metaethical theory 
ought, if possible, to account for and vindicate as much of the deeply embedded aspects of moral 
thought and moral discourse [the ‘phenomenological experience of morality’] as possible (Horgan et 
al 2006, 223).” As I see it the notion of ‘embedded moral thought and moral discourse’ plays the same 
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role as that of the notion of ‘moral intuitions’. The essential idea is that the correctness of a 
metaethical theory is a function of its coherence with our ‘moral intuitions’.  
The second method, referred to as ‘Cornell moral realism’, involves justifying moral realism along 
analogous lines to the justification of scientific realism. Moral properties are viewed as “ontologically 
and epistemologically akin to the properties of natural science” (Tropman 2008, 167). That is, the 
theoretical posits employed by moral theories (moral values which tell us what things, events or 
actions are good or bad) refer to real, mind and theory-independent entities (Boyd 1988, 181). 
There is some disagreement between disputants in the debate between scientific realism and anti-
realism regarding which position bears the argumentative burden of proof. “Does [the burden] fall 
upon the antirealist because realism’s endorsement of science gives it an initial plausibility? Does it 
fall upon the realist because realism makes the stronger epistemic commitment (Leplin 2006, 689)?” I 
will call the general view that the argumentative burden falls on the antirealist ‘the presumption of 
realism’. I will call the view that the argumentative burden falls on the realist ‘the disputation of 
realism’. 
I suggest that the division between adherents of the phenomenological criterion fall into the former 
camp, and adherents to some form of Cornell realism fall into the latter camp. As such, the distinction 
in methods of justification for moral realism is the distinction between the presumption and the 
disputation of moral realism. I will turn now to explore the presumption of moral realism.  
FitzPatrick provides a clear summation of what is involved in the presumption of realism (for a 
detailed example see (FitzPatrick 2013, 4f)). He suggests the correctness of a metaethical position is 
its coherence with our “first order ethical experience and understanding of things, including the kind 
of normative significance it has (FitzPatrick 2013, 4).” FitzPatrick’s “first order ethical experiences 
and understanding” plays the same role as the phrase “embedded moral thought and moral discourse” 
used by Horgan et al. Both play the role of ‘moral intuitions’. So, the metaethical position we should 
endorse is the one which best fits with our ‘moral intuitions’ about the nature of the moral order. 
Moral realism, and not moral anti-realism, he believes, best captures our ‘moral intuitions’ about 
morality and is thereby justified. 
There are two noteworthy features here. The first is the evidentiary role played by our ‘moral 
intuitions’. Our ‘moral intuitions’ are the data against which metaethical theories are judged. If some 
metaethical theory contradicts this data, then that metaethical theory is flawed and worthy of 
rejection. Here, again, our ‘moral intuitions’ are understood as being epistemically reliable, to some 
degree, in some cases.  
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The second noteworthy feature is this. If FitzPatrick is correct then moral realism enjoys coherence 
with the available data and, it is thought, is thereby justified. I see this as another way of stating the 
view that in light of moral realism’s intuitive plausibility it is deviation from moral realism (and not 
endorsement of it) which requires justification. That is, FitzPatrick, seeking to fulfil the 
‘phenomenological criterion’, endorses the ‘presumption of moral realism’. On this view the 
justification for moral realism requires little more than highlighting its (intuitive) plausibility. It is the 
anti-realist, on this view, who must marshal (unintuitive, but independently supported) arguments 
against moral realism. On this view (given that our ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable, to 
some degree, in some cases) if the anti-realist’s arguments are found wanting, moral realism remains a 
warranted position.  
Cornell moral realism is a more elaborately conceived position than this. It falls under the ‘disputation 
of moral realism’ because it takes up the argumentative burden of proof. Boyd announces that ‘moral 
realism’ is a doctrine best understood as strictly analogous to ‘scientific realism’ (Boyd 1988, 181). 
This strikes me as a continuation of the spirit with which Ross viewed the enterprise of moral 
philosophy generally. In order to assess this perspective I will briefly note down some key feature of 
scientific realism and how it is justified. I’ll then move on to highlight the analogy between scientific 
realism and moral realism. My purpose, however, is only to show that moral realism relies on the 
view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are, to some degree, in some cases, epistemically reliable. I cannot 
then provide all of the details of the analogy, only those relevant to my case. As such, there are 
important issues that I won’t be discussing. Before closing the issue, I will, however, mention them.  
Simply put, scientific realism is the view that unobservable entities posited by empirically successful 
scientific theories exist. This ontological commitment is warranted, it is argued, because of 
explanatory and predictive success (Leplin 2006, 686). ‘Success’ here is understood as “explanatory 
and predictive utility (Leplin 2006, 688).” That is, a theory is successful if it can be employed to 
meaningfully explain its target phenomena and make confirmable predictions.  
Scientific realism, generally, is justified abductively. There are, however, two distinct kinds of 
abductive argument in its favour. One focuses on explanatory success, the other focuses on predictive 
novelty (Leplin 2006, 689). For details regarding the problems with the notion of ‘explanatory 
success’, and why ‘predictive novelty’ have come to be seen as more important see (Leplin 2006, 
689f).  
The scientific realist argument can be summarized as follows. If a theory makes successful novel 
predications they are achieved as a result of the theoretical entities and properties employed by that 
theory. The only explanation for the theory’s capacity to achieve such success is that the theoretical 
entities and properties it employs are real (or approximately true). Apart from this view, one is 
committed to the unattractive view that a theory’s capacity for such success is inexplicable. Given the 
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unsavoury nature of this latter view, a theory’s successful novel predictions provide warrant for 
endorsing it’s theoretical entities and properties as real (or approximately true) (Leplin 2006, 691).  
That is the basic strategy for justifying scientific realism. I need do no more than to sketch an outline 
of the strategies involved. Needless to say, there are a number of arguments against scientific realism 
(Leplin 2006, 691ff). However, it is not relevant for our current purposes to review those arguments. I 
will now highlight the most important analogy between the scientific and moral realist views.  
The most important analogy is, as I have noted previously, ‘moral intuitions’ play in moral theories 
the role played by empirical observation in scientific theories (Boyd 1988, 184).Now, Boyd, is 
committed to the conjunction of scientific realism and the theory-ladenness of observation. The 
question for him is how a methodology so saturated by theory-dependence can provide reliable and 
novel results. His answer is that the reliable theories in question, along with their theory-dependent 
methodology, are approximately true: that is, scientific realism is, he argues, the best explanation for 
the success of such a theory-dependent methodology (Boyd 1988, 189).  
This is relevant because this is why, in part, Boyd considers ‘reflective equilibrium’ (generally 
conceived) as the methodology for scientific discovery and the appropriate methodology for moral 
discovery (Boyd 1988, 200). ‘Reflective equilibrium’, for Boyd, is “the dialectical interplay of 
observations, theory and methodology (Boyd 1988, 200)”. He views ‘moral intuitions’ as the 
analogue of observations (Boyd 1988, 184), and by ‘methodology’ he must be making reference to the 
need to weigh up the coherence between ‘observations’, ‘theory’ and our other theoretical 
commitments.  
Again, the details about how Boyd, and others, utilizes ‘reflective equilibrium’ are not important. It is, 
however, important to note what Boyd says about reflective equilibrium in conjunction with his 
scientific realism. Reflective equilibrium is “reliable only on the assumption that the theoretical 
tradition which governs those methodological practices contains theories which are relevantly 
approximately true (Boyd 1988, 201).” Further, he remarks, “Were the realist unable to treat 
observation and measurement as providing “epistemic access” to reality in this way, a constructivist 
[non-realist] treatment of scientific knowledge would be almost unavoidable (Boyd 1988, 201)”.  
This, I take it, is a complex way of expressing a very simple truth. Unless our observations, and/or the 
theoretical framework with which our observations are made, have some contact with the world, it 
would be implausible to think that the theories built up from them would have some contact with the 
world. Unless our observations are in some predictable way epistemically reliable, that our theoretical 
predictions are on occasion vindicated by observations cannot provide us with epistemic warrant to 
believe our theories, or, even, the veracity of our observations.  
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My point is that the analogues of our observations, and their theoretical frameworks, must be thought 
of as providing us with epistemic access of some kind to reality. The implication of Boyd’s position is 
that unless our ‘moral intuitions’ are thought of as being epistemically reliable, to some degree, in 
some cases, a non-realist treatment of moral knowledge is ‘almost unavoidable’.  
It is the proviso that our observations are epistemically reliable which operates in the subtext of 
justifications for scientific realism. This is also required by moral realism if it is to justify itself along 
similar lines or even if it is to be presumed as correct on account of its intuitive plausibility. The 
moral realist requires that our ‘moral intuitions’, somehow or other, be epistemically reliable. That 
result holds whether we follow Ross’s early intuitionism, or Boyd’s more sophisticated scientifically 
inspired reflective equilibrium. Both methods have a central place for our ‘moral intuitions’ as kinds 
of data.  
Before drawing these issues to a close let me mention some important questions I have not been able 
to cover. One is with regards to the nature of a moral ‘theory’, and the strength of the analogy 
between that and a scientific theory (for further information see (Lloyd 2006), (Churchland 1989, 1), 
(Churchland 1981, 69), (Craver 2002, 55), (Richards 1986, 283)).  
Another is what to make of the analogy regarding ‘unobservable entities’ (or ‘theoretical posits’) (for 
further information see (Leplin 2006, 686), (Boyd 1988, 181)).  A more difficult issue is what to 
make, regarding moral theories, of the notions of ‘explanatory success’ (see (Leplin 2006, 687)) and 
‘predictive novelty’ (see ((Leplin 2006, 689), (Boyd 1988, 200)).  
These are interesting questions, but scope does not permit me to deal with them. In any case I do not 
believe they are germane to my current concerns. I will assume, then, that moral realists who argue 
along scientific realist lines have an adequate solution to these problems. Let me round off the point 
of this discussion.  
As I see it there have been three general methods, by which moral realism is justified, under 
discussion. Earlier I spoke about the intuitionism of Moore and Ross. Here I have spoken about the 
‘presumption of moral realism’, and the ‘disputation of moral realism’. Each of these methods is 
distinct in certain senses. What I have wanted to show, however, is that each of them relies on the 
view that our ‘moral intuitions’, to some degree, in some cases, are epistemically reliable. That, as I 
see it, is the commonality which they all share and is the central feature of what I am calling the 
‘moral method’.  
Although there are many varieties of moral realism – as we have seen – they do share a common 
thread. They share a commitment to the reality of moral truths, and our capacity to access them. Apart 
from this, they also share the view that our access to moral truths is mediated, in some or other 
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fashion, by ‘moral intuitions’ because our ‘moral intuitions’, to some degree, in some cases, are 
regarded as epistemically reliable.  
Section 6: Closing Remarks 
I set out to defend two claims 
P1. ‘Moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is epistemological and ontological moral realism. 
P2. The ‘moral method’ depends crucially on the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are, in some cases, 
and to some degree, ‘epistemically reliable’ 
I believe that I have shown that ‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is committed to its 
epistemological and its ontological theses. The realist view is that there are moral facts, these facts are 
objective, we have access to these moral facts, and that access is mediated by some moral method. 
Whatever the variety of ‘moral realism’ we are reviewing, they must accept these four features.  
The second contention I have defended is that the moral method relies on the view that our ‘moral 
intuitions’ are, to some degree, in some cases, epistemically reliable. We have seen that there are a 
variety of different ways of justifying moral realism. The particular details of each of those ways are 
not my concern. I have wished to highlight simply that each of them, in some manner, to one degree 
or another, relies on the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ (in some qualified sense) are epistemically 
reliable. I believe I have shown that to be the case.  
I must note that I have left as an open question the nature of ‘moral truth’ in three distinct ways. In my 
construal of ‘moral realism’ I have not taken a position on whether ‘moral truths’ are ‘natural’ or 
‘non-natural’. Also, I have not taken a position on whether they are contingent truths, or necessary 
truths, or whether they are universal (in the sense that they apply to all ‘rational beings’) or whether 
they are human specific. Further, more generally, I haven’t taken a position on the nature of moral 
truths at all.  
Regarding the first omission, I have not wanted to prejudge the issue in favour of naturalists or non-
naturalists. If moral realism is correct, then possibly it will be naturalistic or non-naturalistic. 
Regarding the second omission, I have not wanted to prejudge this matter here because I take it up in 
Chapter 4. There I provide an argument to suggest that moral truths are more plausibly conceived of 
as contingent and human specific. That view is, however, controversial. Some, like Boyd, I believe, 
could accept this view. Others would not. Nevertheless, I do not think this is an issue relevant for the 
purposes of this chapter.  
Regarding the third omission, I argue in Chapters 5 and 6 that a central problem regarding whether or 
not moral realism is compatible with evolutionary science is that no one has the capacity to advance a 
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prior account of ‘moral truth’ without begging the question, or without falling into incoherence. That 
is a strong claim, and requires further elaboration beyond the scope of this chapter.  
These two premises I have defended are premises within a broader argument. The purpose of P1 is 
two-fold. I want to be clear on what exactly is being denied when scholars suggest that evolutionary 
science renders ‘moral realism’ unjustified or implausible. I also want to be clear on what it means to 
advance a ‘non-traditional’ view of moral realism which is not in conflict with evolutionary science.  
The purpose of P2 is to show that a central feature of ‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is 
dependent on a particular view about the epistemic relevance of our ‘moral intuitions’. If it can be 
shown that this view is incorrect then, as I explained earlier, this renders moral realism implausible, or 
at least unjustified. Further, in the face of such considerations, moral realists will have no recourse to 
the (minimal feature of their) moral method, because the very efficacy of the moral method is in 
question. Given that moral realists do not have another moral method, they will have no recourse at 
all. Those are considerations which will be taken up later. For the moment I believe that I have given 
sufficient justification for P1 and P2.  
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Chapter 2 
Naturalism, Evolutionary Naturalism and Metaethics 
Section 1: Naturalism and Evolutionary Naturalism 
Terms like ‘naturalism’ and ‘naturalist’ do not enjoy a single or fixed definition (Flanagan 2006, 432). 
There are, however, numerous different ‘varieties’ of ‘naturalism’ (Flanagan 2006, 430-431). Broadly 
speaking these are ‘methodological naturalism’, ‘ontological naturalism’ and ‘epistemological 
naturalism’.  
Unfortunately, as I’ll proceed to show, not even a robust generalization can be generated from 
analysing such variety.  What can be gleaned is a more or less vague statement about the general 
approach a naturalist should take to philosophical problems. This, in conjunction with a development 
of the view called ‘evolutionary naturalism’, which I will get to later on, will suffice for my purposes.  
According to Schmitt ‘methodological naturalism’ is the view that the best method of inquiry in the 
social sciences and philosophy are, or at least ought to be modelled on, those of the natural sciences 
(Schmitt 2009, 434).  
Price refers to something similar but uses the label ‘philosophical naturalism’ instead (Price 2004, 
71). Price points out that philosophy and natural science have overlapping concerns. ‘Philosophical 
naturalism’, according to him, is the view that when the concerns overlap we should defer to the 
scientific, rather than the philosophic, results. As I see it this is a weaker version of Schmitt’s 
methodological naturalism. The natural sciences should constrain the method of inquiry and the 
results of philosophy and the social sciences. But Price, unlike Schmitt, does not demand that those 
disciplines adopt the methods of the natural sciences. 
Flanagan, on the other hand, in discussing the ‘methodological naturalism’ of economists, states that 
this is a view which suggests that supernatural (or, non-natural) entities provide no explanatory power 
and so can be dispensed with in that field of inquiry (Flanagan 2006, 434). Now, Schmitt and Price 
take the term ‘natural’ to relate somehow to the natural science or its methods. Flanagan, in this 
context, appears to think that the term ‘natural’ is simply the contrary of whatever is ‘supernatural’ 
(Flanagan 2006, 437). There isn’t consensus, then, regarding what is to be denoted by 
‘methodological naturalism’.  
Regarding ‘ontological naturalism’ Schmitt tells us that it is the view that the only things which are 
real are those things (objects, kinds, properties, etc.) recognized by the natural sciences (Schmitt 2009, 
434). Price puts it somewhat differently by telling us that ‘ontological naturalism’ is the view that the 
world studied by science is, in some sense, the only world that there is (Price 2004, 73). More 
concisely: “Ontological questions […] are on a par with questions of natural science (Quine 1953, 
26 
 
45)”. As Rea notes in his comments on ‘ontological naturalism’, the message is that the correct 
ontology is identical with the ontology of science (Rea 2007, 6). 
Relative agreement notwithstanding, Flanagan raises a potential problem with this view.  He suggests 
that the scope of the view is too wide. It is an ‘all-encompassing’ ontological position proclaiming 
that what there is, and all there is, is the world studied by the natural science (Flanagan 2006, 436). 
He rejects this view on the basis that he does not think human beings have the cognitive capacity or 
access to information to make warranted ‘all-encompassing’ claims (Flanagan 2006, 437).  
He suggests that rather than making such claims about ontology (what there is) tout court we should 
rather make judgments about what we should be ontologically committed to given our cognitive 
capacities and limitations. As such, he offers the somewhat weaker version, still calling it ‘ontological 
naturalism’, that, for all we can and do know, the natural world (the world studied by natural science) 
is all there is (Flanagan 2006, 437). 
That response blurs the line between what Flanagan has called ontological naturalism and what Price 
calls epistemological naturalism. Price tells us that ‘epistemological naturalism’ is the view that only 
natural scientific knowledge is genuine knowledge (Price 2004, 73). This does not differ much from 
suggesting that the only entities to which we can ontologically commit with warrant are those entities 
countenanced by the natural sciences. That, however, is essentially Flanagan’s view.  There is then, 
also, little consensus to be found regarding either ‘ontological’ or ‘epistemological’ naturalism. 
There are still further varieties. Armstrong, for example thinks that ‘naturalism’ is the view that reality 
only consists of a single all-embracing spatio-temporal system (Armstrong 1981, 149). Rea, on the 
other hand, takes the contentious view that ‘naturalism’ is not a philosophical position at all (Rea 
2006, 1). Rather he takes ‘naturalism’ to be a ‘research program’ which he defines as a set of 
methodological dispositions which treats the methods (and presumably the results) of the natural 
sciences as basic sources of evidence (Rea 2006, 3).  
It is clear that there is no unified perspective on how to understand the term ‘naturalism’ (Rea 2006, 
4). A generalized and substantive view cannot be generated from assessing the various positions. 
Indeed, even if we allow for distinctions and look to the varieties themselves for clarity we find yet 
more disagreement.  
We have no choice but to accept a vague definition of ‘naturalism’. This is just that naturalists 
conduct their inquiry in tandem with the methods and results of science (Rea 2006, 5ff). What 
precisely to make of this, either methodologically, or epistemologically, or ontologically, is unclear, 
and a matter of controversy, as we have seen. However, as Ruse notes, the vague but workable 
definition of a naturalist is someone who employs science and the scientific method in order to gain 
27 
 
understanding and knowledge. A naturalist will take a ‘scientific approach’ to the issues he considers 
(Ruse 1995, 1).  
What may be said of ‘evolutionary naturalism’? Rosenberg uses the term ‘Philosophical Darwinism’ 
to mean the same as ‘evolutionary naturalism’. He suggests, in the broad spirit of ‘naturalism’ detailed 
above, that we look to the theory of natural selection in our attempts to solve philosophical problems 
arising within ‘human affairs’ (Rosenberg 2009, 1). Ruse says much the same thing, highlighting the 
relevance of the theory to questions about human nature (Ruse 1995, 8). He predicts that it is only by 
taking an evolutionary approach to issues related to human nature, or human affairs that, “we can 
hope to solve some of the most pressing questions of traditional ethics (Ruse 1995, 9)”.  
Now, a naturalist is someone who conducts their inquiry following a scientific approach, taking 
science to comprise a reliable body of data (generated by a reliable method) to employ in, or to render 
compatible with, their philosophical claims. An evolutionary naturalist, then, is a peculiar kind of 
naturalist. An evolutionary naturalist conducts inquiry regarding the human being, or human affairs, 
including those of ethics and Metaethics, by utilizing data from the evolutionary sciences.  
I believe I have established P3 and P4. In general a ‘naturalist’ conducts their (general philosophical) 
inquiry in tandem with the methods and results of natural science (broadly speaking). Speaking more 
specifically, an ‘evolutionary naturalist’ conducts their inquiry regarding the human being, or human 
affairs, including those of ethics and metaethics, by utilizing data from the evolutionary sciences. 
In order to capture what I can about ‘naturalism’, given the controversy surrounding the term, I will 
use the terms ‘naturalism’ and ‘evolutionary naturalism’ in the following sense. P5: A ‘naturalist’ will 
allow scientific data to underwrite ones philosophical views where possible. Where this is not 
possible, a naturalist will seek to render ones philosophical views compatible with that data. Further, a 
naturalist will reject perspectives which cannot reasonably fit into a broadly scientific worldview. An 
evolutionary naturalist will act similarly with regards to the data of evolutionary science regarding 
matters about human beings or human affairs. Thus I have defended the three minor claims I sought 
to.  
Section 2: What is The Relevance of Evolutionary Science for Metaethics? 
Part of my project involves bringing evidence from the evolutionary sciences to bear on the 
metaethical question of whether or not moral realism is correct. As such, my project is motivated in 
part by my evolutionary naturalism.  
This may strike some as misguided. They may ask, “Why should we concede science a special 
authority to decide questions about the nature of [human beings]? What of the authority of 
philosophy, of religion, of morality […]? Why do I set the authority of science above all these? Why 
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this “scientism” (Armstrong 1981, 2)?” Put differently, why should we attempt to fit the square peg of 
metaethics into the round hole of evolutionary science? 
There are a few answers to this question, and I will focus on two. I find both of them compelling, but I 
only require others to accept the second answer. First, my answer would be similar to Armstrong’s, 
who notes that science, and the scientific method, have proven to be highly reliable and successful. He 
says that, “…in philosophy […] in moral questions in so far as they are thought to be matters of truth 
and falsity, there has been a notable failure to achieve an intellectual consensus about disputed 
questions […] Must we not then attach a peculiar authority to the discipline that can achieve a 
consensus? And if that presents us with a certain vision of the nature of [the human being], is that not 
a powerful reason for accepting that vision? (Armstrong 1981, 3)” 
I think that is a powerful reason to attach such authority to science. Saying this, however, is not more 
than saying that I am committed to evolutionary naturalism. The worry may remain: what relevance 
has any of this for metaethics? Let me then provide an answer which does not beg the question against 
a non-naturalist.  
The metaethical question whether moral realism is true does depend, in part, on a particular view of 
human beings. It is the view that we have psychological capacities such that we can ‘perceive’ (by 
means of ‘moral intuitions’), to some degree, in some cases, moral truths. That is, as I previously 
explained, moral realism depends on the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are, to some degree, in some 
cases, epistemically reliable.  
If evolutionary science has something to say about our psychological capacities (of which our ‘moral 
intuitions’ form a part), as it does, then this has some relevance for our metaethical theorizing, at least 
as it pertains to moral realism. That claim does not, I believe, depend on an evolutionary naturalistic 
approach. The question is: why should we attach a peculiar authority to natural science on such 
matters? The answer is that natural science is reliable at least regarding matters properly within its 
domain.  
The claim that I will now motivate, and only demonstrate in Chapter 3, is the following. Our 
psychological capacities are a matter for scientific investigation, and particularly fruitful work has 
been done in the evolutionary sciences. Given this it is sensible to utilize the data from the 
evolutionary sciences in our ethical and metaethical theorizing. Let me now move on to motivate that 
claim.  
That evolutionary theory should have implications for our understanding of the nature of human 
beings is not a novel idea. Darwin, even at the inception of his proposed theory of evolution, believed 
this to be so. He saw, and took great interest in, the implications of evolutionary theory for our 
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understanding of the human behavioural capacities and dispositions, and even the human mind 
(Griffiths 2008, 393).  
Subsequent scholarship on evolutionary theory also adopted a similar attitude. Sedgwick and Wilson, 
for example, went so far as to suggest that the theory of evolution had shown that the study of 
psychology and sociology we properly inseparable from the study of biology. They said, “the instincts 
and other mental actions … are truly subjects of psychology as of physiological inquiry (emphasis 
added) (Sedgwick et al 1899, 8)”, and say much the same for the complexities of social life and 
sociological inquiry. Later on Moon would remark that, “certainly man is an animal just as truly as the 
beast of the field (Moon 1921, 321)” and “man has also been developed over time by natural selection 
(Moon 1921, 333)
2” 
If Darwin and his followers were correct the lesson is clear. The idiomatic division between our 
biological (‘animal’) nature and our other social (‘civilized’) capacities is not as distinct as common 
sense would have it. “Our sociality is part of our nature. The evolution of social systems is but one 
aspect of human evolution (Wuketits 2009, 400)”. 
Let me then lay out an argument with the aim of justifying the salience of ‘evolutionary naturalism’ to 
matters of metaethics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 One must note the unfortunate biological racism implicit in such tables as they produce on page 340 of their work. This clearly betrays a 
somewhat misunderstood notion of the nature of ‘natural selection’. I make reference to their work simply to show that from quite an early 
stage in the development of the evolutionary sciences, it was a common (if not properly understood) view that human beings, their physical, 
social and mental, capacities and dispositions, are the product of evolution by natural selection.  
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Argument for P6 (Here C6.1) 
P6.1. Our moral capacities (particularly our ‘moral intuitions’) are relevant to the 
justification of our ethical and metaethical perspectives. 
P6.2. Darwin and his contemporaries were correct about the relevance of evolutionary 
theory to our psychological capacities (of which our moral capacities are a part). 
C6.1. Therefore, evolutionary science has relevance for our understanding of the nature 
of our moral capacities 
C6.2. Therefore, evolutionary science has relevance for our ethical and metaethical 
views. 
P6.1 is a more concise way of expressing P2. If my argument there is sound, then P6.1 here is correct. 
Regarding P6.2, the proviso that our moral capacities are part of our overall psychological capacities 
is one taken from my idealized view of ‘moral intuitions’. I cannot here demonstrate the correctness 
of P6.2; I can only briefly motivate it. I will demonstrate it more fully in the next chapter. 
Nevertheless, if P6.2 holds, then we are justified in accepting C6.1 and C6.2.  
Now, Darwin’s initial proposals have proved fruitful as can be seen in the development of 
contemporary evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychology seeks to predict which behaviours, 
and behavioural capacities and dispositions, would have been adaptive during the evolutionary phase 
of Homo sapiens (Griffiths 2008, 402). Human behaviour, even in its variety, can thereby be 
explained, at least to some degree, in terms of mental mechanisms which evolved during that 
evolutionary phase (Griffiths 2008, 402).  
As I will later show, this research program has been relatively successful, although it is noted that 
such success is not without controversy or contestation (Pinker 1997, 205). One of the central 
controversies is whether or not the mind is an adaptation. Some authorities do regard it as an 
adaptation. Pinker, for instance, thinks that the mind is an evolutionary adaption which resulted from 
natural selective pressure (Pinker 1997, 23). Put differently, “the overall task of the mind is survival 
and reproduction in the ancestral environment [… ] (Griffiths 2008, 405)”, and that the nature of our 
current mental, and resultant behavioural, capacities, dispositions and tendencies are (at least 
partially) thereby explained.  
Authority cannot be used as a justification for P6.2 here, especially if there isn’t the kind of consensus 
which Armstrong valued. I intend only to motivate P6.2’s plausibility by highlighting that there is a 
great deal of data which does support P6.2, Pinker and Griffiths being two of the proponents of that 
data.  
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Section 3: Closing Remarks 
I have provided a workable definition of ‘naturalism’ and ‘evolutionary naturalism’. The view that I 
have taken on ‘naturalism’ and ‘evolutionary naturalism’ is, as I see it, a diplomatic way of absorbing 
the controversy surrounding methodological, ontological, and epistemological naturalism. It is vague, 
but nevertheless, workable. I have, then, defended the three minor claims I introduced at the 
beginning of this chapter.  
I have also provided some motivation for regarding the findings of evolutionary science as relevant to 
our ethical and metaethical theorizing. The claim which I endorse is: P6. Evolutionary science has 
relevance for our understanding of the nature of our moral capacities (read: ‘moral intuitions’). This 
claim, however, depends on a premise (P6.2. Darwin and his contemporaries were correct about the 
relevance of evolutionary theory to our psychological capacities (of which our moral capacities are a 
part)).which, as far as I have shown, remains controversial. I will demonstrate the plausibility of P6.2 
in the next chapter. For now, I hope I have provided some motivation for endorsing, at least, the 
plausibility of P6. Formally, however, what I have shown is P6* (if P6.2 holds, then we are justified 
in accepting C6.1 and C6.2.) if evolutionary theory can be applied to matters of psychology then 
evolutionary science has relevance for our understanding of the nature of our moral capacities (read: 
‘moral intuitions’).  
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Chapter 3 
Evolutionary Science 
Section 1: The Problem of Human Sociality 
What is referred to by the notion of ‘human sociality’ is, broadly speaking, the array of human social 
institutions, behaviours and norms. These are characterized, it seems, by social cooperation, altruistic 
– non-self-serving – exchanges, and by the observance of moral codes which require unselfish 
behavior and attitudes (Rosenberg 2008, 190). Human sociality is a real phenomenon, and non-human 
sociality can also be observed variously in nature (Alexander 2008, 416). Such phenomena pose 
problems for evolutionary theory. It would seem that cooperative and altruistic behavior, generally 
regarded as fitness diminishing behavior, would not be selected for. It’s only behaviours which 
increase individual fitness which would be selected for (Alexander 2008, 415). The solutions to these 
problems, and principally those provided by evolutionary psychology, have, I will argue, particular 
salience for our practices of ethical and metaethical theorizing.  
One early solution to the problem was the theory of ‘kin selection’ and ‘inclusive fitness’ (Rosenberg 
2008, 190). The proposal was that altruism toward close kin (family members sharing genes) could be 
selected for because this kind of altruism would increase the relative frequency of those genes in the 
gene pool. That is, altruistic, even self-sacrificial, behavior toward kin could enhance inclusive fitness 
in terms of genes even if not in terms of individual organisms, and would, then be selected for 
(Rosenberg 2008, 190). While that may have solved the problem of cooperation among kin, it doesn’t 
solve the problem of human sociality. Human sociality, after all, is characterized by cooperation 
among unrelated individuals (Rosenberg 2008, 191).  
One such solution was that of ‘reciprocity’, or ‘reciprocal altruism’ (Alexander 2008, 416). Simply 
put this is the idea that cooperation, under particular circumstances, can benefit both cooperating 
parties more so than if they fail to cooperate (Rosenberg 2008, 191). The ‘Prisoners Dilemma’3, a 
particular game featured in Game Theory, is capable of rendering the reciprocal altruism hypothesis 
testable. Axelrod (1984) was able to put the hypothesis to a test of sorts. He confirmed that reciprocal 
altruism could have been selected for by showing that a ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy in the iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma is the best strategy for players who are rationally self-interested (Rosenberg 2008, 194). 
Many more different experiments have been performed, and the results have consistently shown what 
Axelrod first revealed (Rosenberg 2008, 197). 
Reciprocal altruism gives us an explanation of how altruistic and cooperative behavior can evolve 
even among non-related individuals (Alexander 2008, 418). In order to successfully carry out, and be 
                                                          
3 For a detailed explanation of Game Theory, and Prisoners Dilemma games, see (Rosenberg 2008, 191-193) 
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motivated toward, such behavior people require certain other capacities and talents. This will include 
capacities to recognize fairness and equality (Rosenberg 2008, 197), as well as capacities to recognize 
‘cheating’, or ‘unfair’, behavior, and motivations to punish such behavior (Rosenberg 2008, 201). On 
the other hand people must be motivated against ‘cheating’ behavior, providing more incentive to 
‘cooperate’. This requires something like the emotions of guilt and shame incurred after one does 
something one recognizes to be ‘wrong’ (Rosenberg 2008, 203).  
So, clearly, reciprocal altruism provides a plausible solution to the problem of human sociality. The 
solution, however, requires making reference to a range of other (let’s call them) socially relevant 
emotional capacities and motivational dispositions. These, in turn, are used as partial explanations for 
our more particular ethical habits and institutions (Ruse 2010, 299).  
Section 2: Evolutionary Psychology 
This brings the work of evolutionary psychology to the fore. Evolutionary psychologists are 
‘nativists’ about the human mind. That is the view that many of our behavioural traits, capacities and 
dispositions are the results of, or at any rate enabled by, particular psychological ‘modules’ which are 
genetically coded in our brains (Rosenberg 2008, 199). This is the result of the view that behaviours 
are events the causes of which are certain mental states. As such, to detail the evolutionary 
development of some kind of behavior, or behavioural disposition, is an elliptical way of detailing the 
evolutionary development of certain psychological mechanisms and capacities, the output of which 
are the behavioural events (Buller 2007, 259).  
I think that natural selection will surely be responsive to our behavioural outputs
4
, but what is selected 
for is what allows for such behavioural outputs, which are the mental states which lie behind our 
behaviours. It is, properly speaking then, certain psychological mechanisms and capacities which are 
the selected for adaptations, rather than the behaviours as such. The goal of evolutionary psychology, 
then, is to describe the nature and functions of those psychological mechanisms and capacities (Buller 
2007, 259).  
This is significant and relates to what I just alluded to above. Evolutionary science has given us 
explanations for capacities and dispositions towards altruistic and cooperative behavior. These 
explanations must make reference to – in fact, it provides explanations for the emergence of – certain 
psychological capacities and dispositions.  
In order for ‘tit-for-tat’ (reciprocal altruistic) strategies to work, users of that strategy must have a 
“free rider detection device” (Rosenberg 2008, 201) which is genetically encoded. That is, creatures 
must have, as a matter of their genetics, psychological capacities to recognize and pick out cheaters, 
                                                          
4 Say, for instance, ones behaving in a cooperative way, the result of which is increased fitness.  
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creatures who play ‘unfairly’, who won’t or don’t reciprocate. That creatures have this psychological 
module is evidenced by the ‘Wason Selection Test’5. This enables creatures to recognize which 
members ‘ought’ to be punished for their failure to cooperate (Koukl 1998, 3).  
The nativist hypothesis can also explain why we happen to fear some of the things we ordinarily do. 
Nativists argue that our psychological capacities and dispositions would have evolved during what is 
called the Pleistocene epoch (approximately 1.8 million to 10 thousand years ago) (Buller 2007, 259). 
As such, our psychological adaptations would have been those selected for by the environmental 
pressures of that time, rather than of the present day (Buller 2007, 259). Rather than having an innate 
fear of, say, cars and electrical plugs (in fact, statistically, quite dangerous features of our present 
environment), we find that we have innate fears, or phobias, for things like snakes and mushrooms 
(Rosenberg 2008, 202). The latter, and not the former, would have been threats during the Pleistocene 
epoch. This adds support to the nativist hypothesis – we should expect, if they are right, that we do 
have such phobias for snakes and mushrooms, rather than cars and electrical plugs.  
The point is that our brain, and its capacities, has been developed by natural selection (Danninger 
1994, 1). This includes all of our emotions, those of friendship, or sympathy, including our senses of 
justice, fairness, shame, and guilt (Danninger 1994, 6). This even includes our capacity for happiness 
and our capacities for pain, and the resultant motivations they provide us (Danninger 1994, 7f). These 
nativist explanations enjoy a good deal of experimental support. The details of these experiments and 
their results are not my current concern. For further details, however, see: (Rosenberg 2008, 203-204), 
(Danninger 1994, 1.), (Greene 2003, 848f), (Krebs 2008), (Krebs 2008), (DeScioli et al 2009).    
What I wish to highlight is that the claim is that ‘ethical’ behavior, for which our ancestors were 
selected, likely is more accurately described along psychologistic lines. That is, what was selected for 
in our ancestors, because of their ‘ethical’ (read: adaptive) behavior, was certain psychological 
capacities and dispositions which allow and motivate us to behave ‘ethically’. 
All of this data shows that evolutionary theory can be fruitfully applied to matters of psychology. As I 
indicated in Chapter 1, our ‘moral intuitions’ form part of our evolved psychology. If I am correct 
about that, then P6 is justified. Evolutionary science, then, does have relevance for our understanding 
of the nature of our ‘moral intuitions’. I will continue in the next section to further support my take on 
‘moral intuitions’ described in Chapter 1, thereby to providing further support for P6. 
Section 3: Responding To Challenges to Nativism 
Now, there are various problems and objections which have been raised against the enterprise of 
evolutionary psychology and, in particular, the nativist hypothesis. I cannot deal with these issues 
                                                          
5 For a more detailed account of what this test involves see (Rosenberg 2008, 200) 
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exhaustively, but I will mention two of them, and say a few words in response. The first major strand 
of objections are politically motivated (Rosenberg 2008, 203-207).  
The nativist hypothesis has been used to infer that certain social phenomena (such as differences in 
gender norms, differences in gender abilities, the inferiority (in terms of IQ) of certain racial groups to 
name just a few (Rosenberg 2008, 206)) are the results of evolutionary adaptations. Some have taken 
this to be the view that certain features of the current (unjust) social arrangements are genetically 
determined, and that as such we cannot expect to alter this arrangement (Rosenberg 2008, 205) and it 
may even be harmful to attempt it (Rosenberg 2008, 203).  
Critics, then, have seen the nativist hypothesis as linked to the justification of unjust social and 
political arrangements. On this basis they have rejected it. In response I agree with Rosenberg who 
says that there is nothing in the nativist hypothesis which logically entails a political ideology in 
favour of these injustices. Nativists may be correct, say, that gender differences are adaptive, but this 
does not mean that we must view political, social and economic gender inequality as justified 
(Rosenberg 2008, 206). The objection that since nativism justifies political injustice it is incorrect is 
not a good one.  
Another more serious concern comes from the view that nativism is incorrect because our 
psychological (including our moral) capacities are possibly not adaptations at all. The suggestion is 
that they may be ‘spandrels’. Rather than being adaptations, these are by-products of other adaptations 
and have themselves no adaptive value (Ruse 2010, 299). Nativist hypotheses are said to be “just so” 
stories about the alleged adaptive value of this or another trait or module.  But because of the nature 
of these “just so” stories (easily invented, difficult to disconfirm or confirm) they cannot serve as 
credible evolutionary explanations (Rosenberg 2008, 207). As such, our psychological capacities may, 
after all, just be spandrels, in which case it would not be correct to say that they, or our moral 
capacities, were adaptations.   
What is ultimately at issue, for my purposes, is whether or not our ‘moral intuitions’ may be regarded 
as epistemically reliable. I think that if it is accepted that our psychological capacities are adaptations 
or spandrels (and not the work of some divine intelligence or some occult power) we will find that we 
cannot affirm that our ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable.  
In the first case, if our moral capacities are adaptations, as others in the literature suggest (the details 
of which are in Chapter 4), our ‘moral intuitions’ would not reflect ‘moral truths’, just evolutionarily 
adaptive strategies which worked sufficiently well for our ancestors. In the second case (also 
developed in Chapter 4), if our moral capacities are spandrels, it would be very implausible to 
suppose that our ‘moral intuitions’ reflected ‘moral truths’ because we would have no reason to 
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expect them to develop in accordance with such truths. That is, we may take it as highly improbable 
that our ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable, in the second case.  
My position regarding the second case is a version of Street’s position. She argues that if moral 
realists believe that there is no relation between moral truths and the evolutionary development of our 
‘moral intuitions’ they must regard our ‘moral intuitions’ as very probably not epistemically reliable.  
She says, “Allowing our [‘moral intuitions’] to be shaped by evolutionary influences is analogous to 
setting out for Bermuda and letting the course of your boat be determined by the wind and the tides 
[…] the historical push of natural selection on the content of our [‘moral intuitions’] has nothing to do 
with [moral] truth […] every now and then, Darwinian pressures might have happened to push us 
toward accepting a [‘moral intuition’] that accords with one of the realist’s independent [moral] truths. 
But this would be purely a matter of chance, since by hypothesis there is no relation between the 
forces at work and the “destination” in question, namely [moral] truth (emphasis added) (Street 2006, 
121f).” 
She continues, “[…] we are left with the implausible skeptical conclusion that our [‘moral intuitions’] 
are in all likelihood mostly off track […] we should have been evolving towards affirming the 
independent [moral] truths posited by the realist, but instead […] we have been evolving toward 
affirming whatever evaluative content tends to promote reproductive success. (Street 2006, 121f).” 
Her position, as quoted, relies on the nativist hypothesis in question, but I believe that we can get 
similar results without the nativist hypothesis. Whether or not our ‘moral intuitions’ are adaptations, 
realists must take a position on the relation between their development and moral truth. Even if our 
‘moral intuitions’ are spandrels, if there is no relation between their non-adaptive development as by-
product of other adaptations and moral truth, then it remains highly unlikely that they track moral 
truths. That is, even if they are spandrels, it remains unlikely that our ‘moral intuitions’ are 
epistemically reliable.  
In neither case, then, may we conclude that it is plausible to regard our ‘moral intuitions’ as 
epistemically reliable. Now, while this objection is an important objection for the nativist hypothesis 
per se, if it succeeds it does not provide support for the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are 
epistemically reliable. Just so long as we are evolutionary naturalists, and do not countenance occult 
forces which directed our moral adaptations or spandrels to track moral truths, we do not have good 
reasons to suppose that they are epistemically reliable.  
Whether our psychological capacities are adaptations or spandrels, then, is a question on which I need 
not take a stand just as long as our psychological capacities have been influenced by our evolution at 
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all. This controversy only becomes relevant in Chapter 6. My support for ‘moral realism’ (non-
traditionally construed) does depend on nativism. But this controversy is irrelevant until then.  
Section 4: Moral Nativism – The Evolution of ‘Moral Intuitions’ 
What scholars intend by these various labels (conscience, moral sense, etc. (see Chapter 1)) is, I take 
it, what moral philosophers generally, and moral realists in particular, intend by the notion of ‘moral 
intuition’. If I am correct, then we may regard our ‘moral intuitions’ as evolved. We may regard them 
as adaptations, of some kind, and as selected because they were fitness enhancing for our evolutionary 
ancestors (Ruse 2010, 307). Let me continue to support this view and so to further motivate my take 
on the notion as described in Chapter 1.  
Moral realists take our ‘moral intuitions’ to be propositional – they represent truth-functional claims. 
Evolutionary science indicates that we have evolved cognitive capacities to solve (that is: make 
decisions about) various social dilemmas. While this involves the application of emotive responses – 
so-called ‘gut reactions’ – it also involves the more robust cognitive judgments that we have the 
capacity to infer from these emotive responses. Perhaps the most primitive aspects of our ‘moral 
intuitions’ are non-cognitive, but it’s clear that our moral capacities are developed such that we have 
the capacity to reformulate such non-cognitive responses into bona fide propositional judgments about 
what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Evolutionary science, then, seems to confirm one of the central 
contentions raised by moral realists: that our ‘moral intuitions’ and judgments are propositional. 
Moral realists also rely on the universality of our ‘moral intuitions’ and judgments. Our ‘moral 
intuitions’ cannot be, according to realists, entirely culturally relative, but there must be some 
underlying uniformity in our capacity for recognizing which things are intuitively right and wrong. 
Here, again, evolutionary science appears to confirm this realist contention. Our ‘moral intuitions’, 
because they are adaptations, are likely to be (are hypothesized to be) “species-typical and species-
specific” (Buller 2007, 261). That is, the kinds of intuitions which we have are likely to be universal 
among human beings, but are not necessarily present in other creatures whose evolutionary trajectory 
involved different environmental pressures. Nativists view the variety among human value systems as 
merely a surface property of human sociality which is underwritten by a more universal genuine 
‘human nature’ (Buller 2007, 261). Different cultural trajectories can account for some of the surface 
differences, but they are variations made possible by a basically uniform underlying nature (Ruse 
2010, 307).  
Another feature still is the very obviousness with which we apprehend the content of certain ‘moral 
intuitions’. That is, certain moral judgments appear so obviously correct that it would be difficult to 
seriously consider their error. This is accounted for by the very innateness of our ‘moral intuitions’ – a 
general feature of the nativist hypothesis.  
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We may also consider the issue that our ‘moral intuitions’ are not necessarily stable regarding certain 
problems, and particularly unhelpful regarding certain others. Here I think of various moral dilemmas, 
both real and contrived, to which we do not have intuitively obvious answers. For example, as Peter 
Singer pointed out, it is clear that we should help a drowning child if no cost will be incurred by us in 
doing so. It is less clear, however, that we should give money to charities which help dying children in 
distant countries. 
Evolutionary science can provide a plausible explanation of why this happens. In particular, it can tell 
us why there are certain moral questions for which we have clear answers, and certain other questions, 
technically similar, to which we do not have clear answers. It is hypothesized that our ‘moral 
intuitions’ evolved to solve the particular problems faced by our evolutionary ancestors (Buller 2007, 
259). These would have been the problems faced by pre-industrial, pre-agricultural, hunter gatherers 
(Buller 2007, 259), who lived in small, close knit societies (Danninger 1994, 1). Our adaptations are 
not selected for, and might not function ideally, in our current, ‘post-Pleistocene’, environments, 
which is in some ways significantly different to our Pleistocene environments (Buller 2007, 259).  
Plausibly then, the explanation for our lack of intuitive grasp on the morality of certain issues, which 
relate to our current environment, is that our ‘moral intuitions’ were not designed for our current 
environment. Plausibly the reason why we are so motivated to save a drowning child, say, but so 
relatively unmotivated to donate to charities which do the same thing, is that our evolutionary 
ancestors did not have to deal with, and weren’t affected by, the problems of distant people. This is a 
version of the explanation provided by the experiments performed by Greene, regarding our distinct 
responses to the two functionally equivalent versions of the ‘trolley problem6’ (Greene 2003, 848). 
Our ‘moral intuitions’, then, have a limited field of application because they were selected for a 
limited, and quite specific, set of problems. 
I think I have sufficiently justified my particular take on ‘moral intuitions’. Evolutionary science does 
provide some plausible explanations for a number of features of our ‘moral intuitions’ (as thought of 
by moral philosophers). We are correct, I think, to regard our ‘moral intuitions’ as aspects of our 
psychology. We are justified in thinking that our psychology, including this component of it, is 
evolved. I believe that this justifies P6.2. Since we found there that if P6.2 holds, then we are justified 
in accepting C6.1 and C6.2, we are justified in accepting P6. That is we are justified in accepting that 
                                                          
6 See (Greene 2003) and (Singer 2005) for a more elaborate discussion of the issue. The essentials of the ‘trolley problem’ are the following. 
In one scenario there is a trolley on its way to hit and kill 5 people. One has a choice to divert the trolley away from the 5 people by flipping 
a switch so that the trolley switches rails and instead only hits and kills 1 person. In another scenario there is a trolley on its way to hit and 
kill 5 people. One has a choice to push a large person in front of the trolley which will stop the trolley, save the 5 people, but kill the large 
person in the process. For the first scenario most people find it intuitively clear that they must flip the switch to save 5 people by killing 1 
person. For the second scenario most people find it intuitively wrong to push the large person in front of the trolley, thus finding it wrong to 
save 5 people by killing 1 person. The scenarios are essentially the same, and it is a source of confusion why we should have such different 
responses to the two scenarios. Greene’s solution is that our brains have evolved to be more sensitive to ‘up-close-and-personal’ conflicts, 
and less sensitive to impersonal conflicts. Plausibly, in the first scenario, the killing of 1 person to save 5 is a quite impersonal conflict. In 
the second scenario matters are more ‘up-close-and-personal’.  
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evolutionary science has relevance for our understanding of the nature of our moral capacities (read: 
‘moral intuitions’). By implication we are correct generally in regarding evolutionary science as 
relevance for our ethical and metaethical views.  
Section 5: The Relevance of Evolutionary Science to Ethics and Metaethics 
I would like, now, to provide a sketch of what various philosophers have taken the implications of 
evolutionary science for moral realism to be. I will go into more detail about the implications in the 
next chapter.  
One of the implications is with regards to the epistemic reliability of our ‘moral intuitions’. Earlier on 
I noted that our ‘moral intuitions’ are adaptations, and we have them as a result of natural selection. 
This is taken to have serious implications for our moral theorizing. Rosenberg notes that an 
evolutionary explanation of our moral norms, and the ‘moral intuitions’ which underlie them, 
threatens to explain our norms away (Rosenberg 2008, 222). The nature of our ‘moral intuitions’, 
including their content, can be explained by evolutionary science without “the hypothesis that any 
moral norms [or the ‘moral intuitions’ underlying them] are true and justified (Rosenberg 2008, 
223)”. 
Ruse is quite convinced that taking seriously the evolutionary explanations of our ‘moral intuitions’ 
leads us to a kind of anti-realism. No metaethical justification can be, he believes, given for our moral 
norms and the ‘moral intuitions’ underlying them. Ultimately, we have our ‘moral intuitions’, and 
they are the way they are, for quite contingent reasons. We have them as a result of adaptive problems 
faced by our evolutionary ancestors, and not because they are ‘epistemically reliable’, as moral 
realists would think (Ruse 2010, 308).   
One evolutionary scientist cited in Koukl’s paper says, “It is amazing that a process as amoral and 
crassly pragmatic as natural selection could design a mental organ that makes us feel as if we’re in 
touch with a higher truth. Truly a shameless ploy (emphasis added) (Koukl 1998, 4).” This is in 
reference to a phenomenon which Ruse has highlighted, that our ‘moral intuitions’ provides us with a 
genuine feeling that certain things are right and other things are wrong. It is not a masked, or muffled, 
vague awareness, but often a very vivid appreciation of what seems to be a moral reality (Ruse 2010, 
307). Of course, it is this ‘vivid appreciation’ which is alleged to be a shameless ploy. It is a trick, if 
you will, played on us by evolution because it was beneficial that our evolutionary ancestors fell for it.  
Singer notes that evolutionary science poses a threat to the veracity of the method of wide reflective 
equilibrium (Singer 2005, 348). That is, evolutionary science poses a threat to the current method 
employed by moral realists in justifying their metaethical realism as well as their ethical theories. He 
says, “[…] recent scientific advances in our understanding do have some normative significance […] 
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At the more general level of method in ethics, this same understanding of how we make moral 
judgments casts serious doubt on the method of reflective equilibrium. There is little point in 
constructing a moral theory designed to match considered moral judgments that themselves stem from 
our evolved responses to the situations in which we and our ancestors lived during the period of our 
evolution as social mammals, primates, and finally, human beings (Singer 2005, 348).” I believe the 
point is that there is something amiss in thinking that employing the contingent solutions to problems 
faced by our evolutionary ancestors (solutions which helped them survive and reproduce) in our 
ethical and metaethical theories guides us to some objective moral reality. 
He notes, though, that it appears as if ethical and metaethical theorizing requires, even in just a 
minimal sense, employing some kind of ‘moral intuitions’. Otherwise, he fears, the enterprise would 
be quite unworkable. I have also defended this view, it is the proposition expressed in P2. The moral 
method crucially depends on the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are, in some cases, to some degree, 
‘epistemically reliable’. Our ethical and metaethical theories depend on this view and, as a 
consequence, must employ, even in some minimal sense, our ‘moral intuitions’.  
He fears that following through on his line of reasoning, negating the epistemic reliability of our 
‘moral intuitions’, entails that we become moral skeptics or moral nihilists (Singer 2005, 349). 
Singer’s fears are not unreasonable. Here is the argument. If evolutionary science does not require the 
hypothesis that our ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable; If their nature and content is purely 
contingent, the result of blind forces of natural selection; if the sense that they give us, that they point 
to a moral reality, is a trick which was simply beneficial to our ancestors, who lived in a significantly 
different environment to us; then (depending on how strongly we read these premises) there is little to 
suppose, the view that our intuitions can count as epistemically reliable data which can be used to 
guide us to some moral truth.   
Singer says that, in light of such data, we face a choice. Essentially he says that we can take 
evolutionary science seriously, which leads us to a form of moral scepticism or moral nihilism. Or we 
may embark on the “ambitious” task of separating those moral judgments which we make as a result 
of our evolutionary history, and those which have a ‘purely rational’ basis. Taking the latter option, he 
believes, allows for one way to continue with the moral philosophic enterprise (Singer 2005, 351).  
Section 6: Closing Remarks 
It’s not my intention here to evaluate these gloomy prospects, but it is important to make a note of 
them. To conclude, we are justified in accepting P6, that evolutionary science is relevant to ethical 
and metaethical theorizing, and, in particular, to moral realism. It can provide us with important 
information regarding the nature and content of our ‘moral intuitions’.  In particular, it has 
implications for how we view the epistemic significance of our ‘moral intuitions’. Evolutionary 
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science seems to suggest, contra moral realist’s, that our ‘moral intuitions’ are not epistemically 
reliable. Given P2, this suggests that a crucial aspect of the moral realist enterprise cannot succeed. 
Singer’s fears may be justified, for it seems that evolutionary science may support some form of 
moral anti-realism. For now I have sought to highlight this potential problem, in a broad, but not yet 
detailed, fashion. I will take up the details of this problem in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4 
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments 
Section 1: Argument 1 
“The first thing we observe about moral rules is that, although they exist, they are not 
physical and don’t have physical properties […] they are immaterial entities […] if 
nonphysical things – like moral rules – truly exist, then [naturalism] as a world view is 
false (Koukl 1998, 6).” 
“Indeed, these [moral] statements appear to report non-natural facts which cannot be 
accommodated in naturalism’s metaphysics, nor are they amenable to evidential support 
by the employment of scientific methods that naturalism countenances (Rosenberg 2009, 
346)” 
P1. ‘Moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is epistemological and ontological moral 
realism. 
P7. The objective moral facts countenanced by ‘moral realism’ are non-natural   
P8. Evolutionary naturalism entails that there are no non-natural entities 
C1. Therefore moral realism is false. 
P8 is an implication of P5. As I indicated, an evolutionary naturalist will reject perspectives which 
cannot reasonably fit into a scientific world view. If objective moral facts cannot be naturalistically 
construed then, for an evolutionary naturalist there can be no such facts at all. This is an 
uncontroversial implication.  
P7 is the more controversial premise. The view expressed by P7 has historical precedence. 
Historically moral realists have been non-naturalists for one reason or another. Plato, for instance, 
believed that moral facts literally resided in a separate ‘realm’ which really existed independently of 
the empirically observable world (Jacobs 2002, 3). 
Moore followed this view somewhat (Jacobs 2002, 5). He endorsed the further claim that what was 
morally ‘good’ could not be linguistically defined – such definitions would identify what was ‘good’ 
with items or concepts one could always show to have a distinct, and so, non-identical, meaning 
(Moore 2004, 86). What is ‘good’ must be so sui generis, for Moore. Kant, for various complex 
reasons, believed that moral worth was the product of (resided in) a distinctly non-empirical reality 
(that in which the ‘rational will’ properly resides), in virtue of its non-empirical, and ‘pure’ nature 
(Kant 2002, G 4: 400). 
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Examples could be multiplied and elaborated; the point is that at least if history is anything to go by, 
there is a historical trend for moral realists to endorse the non-naturalism expressed in P7. Perhaps 
Rosenberg is following this historical trend. He says that (realistically construed) moral judgments 
express non-natural facts (Rosenberg 2009, 346). Certainly Craig (Craig 1997, 10) and Koukl (Koukl 
1998, 6) take this position for theological reasons. The view that they express is not, however, unique. 
I already argued for P1, and P8 is simply an implication of ‘evolutionary naturalism’. If P7 is correct 
(and there is historical precedence to accept it) as I said, clearly ‘moral realism’ is false.  
I think that P7 is disagreeable for three reasons. The first is that, as presented by Koukl and Craig, it 
seems to represent their religious bias, rather than the conclusion of a considered argument on their 
part. Neither argues for that position, both simply presuppose it. Further, nothing that we have seen so 
far suggests that non-naturalistic moral realism is the only way to construe ‘moral realism’. I take it 
then to be question begging against non-theistic, or naturalistic, moral realists such as Boyd and his 
‘homeostatic consequentialism’.  
Thirdly, it does not seem as if P7 is an implication of P1. Nothing about my construal of ‘moral 
realism’ presupposes naturalism or non-naturalism, and so P1 begs no questions against either 
position. ‘Moral realism’ is, so I think I have shown, compatible with either a naturalistic or a non-
naturalistic perspective. If there are reasons to think that naturalism or non-naturalism are false, they 
are not implicit in the definition of ‘moral realism’ and so require independent argumentation. None 
of the scholars under review provides those arguments.  
I have already justified my position on P1, and it does not require that one take a stand on naturalism 
or non-naturalism. P7 is not an implication of P1. The conclusion does not follow from its premises, 
so Argument 1 is unsuccessful.  
Section 2: Argument 2 
“In short, ethical premises […] can be understood solely as mechanisms that are 
adaptive for the species that possesses them […] No abstract moral principles exist 
outside the particular nature of individual species […] this is obviously quite 
inconsistent with the notion of morality as a set of objective, eternal verities. Morality is 
rooted in contingent human nature, through and through. Nor is it possible to uphold the 
true objectivity of morality by believing in the existence of an ultimate code, such that 
what is considered right corresponds to what is truly right (emphasis added) (Ruse and 
Wilson 1986, 186)” 
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P9. Moral realism requires that there are universal, non-contingent, moral principles 
which to which our ‘moral intuitions’ give us epistemic access.   
P10. Evolutionary science provides us with an explanation of our ‘moral intuitions’ 
which renders our ‘moral intuitions’, and their content, radically contingent.  
C2. Therefore, we have no warrant to believe that there are any universal, non-
contingent, moral principles 
C3. Therefore, evolutionary science takes away our warrant for endorsing moral realism 
The basic issue here is the view that moral realism requires that ‘objective moral facts’ are non-
contingent facts. If it turns out that moral facts are contingent then moral realism cannot be true. If it 
turns out that our epistemic capacities grant us access to merely contingent ‘moral’ facts, then we 
have no warrant to endorse moral realism.  
Ruse and Wilson suggests that moral realism requires that there are “objective eternal (Ruse and 
Wilson 1986, 186)”  moral truths, represented by realistically construed ‘abstract moral principles’ 
existing independently of the nature of individual species (Ruse and Wilson 1986, 186). Joyce agrees 
with this. He holds that ‘moral realism’ is basically identical to Kantian deontology, in which 
‘morality’ as such is viewed as a system of ‘categorical’ imperatives. These categorical imperatives 
are normative injunctions which apply to persons irrespective of any goals, beliefs, or empirical (read: 
genetic) nature of those persons (Joyce 2000, 1). Rosenberg and Sommers also endorse this view of 
moral realism (Sommers and Rosenberg 2003, 667). This is the view distilled in P9.  
P10 is an implication of P6 which I argued for in Chapter 3. Ruse and Wilson (as well as Joyce and 
Rosenberg and Sommers) highlights that our moral capacities are the results of solutions stumbled 
upon by our evolutionary ancestors to the adaptive problems they faced (Ruse and Wilson 1986, 186). 
Our particular moral capacities, then, are grounded in our particular, contingent, human nature. Other 
creatures, with a different evolutionary trajectory, may well develop other forms of ‘morality’. The 
nature and content of our ‘moral intuitions’ (and, even that we have them at all) are contingent. 
I claimed in Chapter 3 that we are justified in holding this whether or not we view our ‘moral 
intuitions’ as adaptations or spandrels. In the case that they are adaptations, then they, and their 
content, are the result of contingent circumstances. In the case that they are spandrels then they, and 
their content, most likely are accidental and similarly contingent (since they are the by-products of 
other adaptations). If our ‘moral intuitions’ are evolved in either sense, (or not the product of occult 
forces) then P10 is justified.  
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If P9 and P10 are correct, then I believe that C2 and C3 follow. However, for two reasons, I do not 
think that P9 is correct. For one, it strikes me as implausible that a moral realist must require that the 
truth-makers of moral judgments are independent of contingent facts about human beings. Morality, it 
seems to me, must relate very particularly to human beings if it is to be meaningful at all. 
I think that for the following reason. Most of the claims we make which we recognize as ‘moral 
claims’ do relate one way or another to contingent facts about the world, or about our natures. We 
ordinarily make reference to the badness of misery and pain, or the goodness or happiness or joy. 
Some theorize about how best to treat each other, or children, or animals. Some speak about the 
environment and which steps we should take so as not to destroy it. All of these claims as we saw in 
Chapters 2 and 3 make reference to contingent facts.  
As such, I disagree with Joyce (Joyce 2000, 10) in his insistence that our moral discourse implies a 
commitment to ‘categorical imperatives’. Our moral discourse, in which we make claims about what 
in the world is good and bad, and make judgments about which courses of actions were right and 
wrong, and so on, is saturated by claims which depend nearly entirely on contingent facts.  
Let us take ‘pain’ as a narrow example. We saw in Chapters 2 and 3 that we have good reasons to 
suppose that the nature of the pains we might feel, and our very capacity to feel pain at all, are 
adaptive features of our natures. If not this, then they are the by-products of other adaptations. In 
either case, they are probably the results of quite contingent (Darwinian) forces. The claim that to 
inflict pain on an innocent person is wrong is, if true, dependent in some complex sense on such 
contingent happenings. This does not need to imply that it is not really, objectively, wrong to inflict 
pain on innocent people.  
It may be wrong for any human being to inflict pain on innocent people, even if the emergence of 
human beings is a contingent happening. It may even be wrong to inflict pain on innocent people for 
any ‘rational being’ (if we follow Kant’s terminology) even if the emergence of rational beings is, in 
some ultimate sense, a contingent affair. Construing P9 as Joyce, and Ruse, et al, do seems to construe 
it in an unnecessarily strong sense. Nothing about the contingency of our moral capacities, or our 
human nature, or the world itself, need imply that there cannot be objective facts about what is good 
or bad. More specifically, what I mean is that objective facts need not be construed as non-contingent 
and universal.  
This leads to the second reason for my rejection of P9. As I showed in Chapter 1 nothing about ‘moral 
realism’ demands that we take this strong view. There is no reason to think that a moral realist must 
be committed to the existence of ‘abstract moral principles’ which are eternally true and which are 
true apart from our contingent natures.  
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It is open to us to take the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are not indubitable insights into moral truth, 
but pieces of evidence, fallible and revisable, which can be marshalled in favour of certain moral 
claims. In this case they are like our empirical observations. We do not regard the objectivity of 
scientific claims as requiring that their truth-makers are ‘abstract scientific principles’, which bear no 
relation to the contingent facts of the world. Similarly we need not regard the objectivity of our moral 
claims to require that either. Even if that is not to follow the letter of the early moral realists described 
in Chapter 1, it is to follow their spirit, and it is to follow the claims of contemporary moral realists 
like Boyd, FitzPatrick, Daniels, and others.  
There is, as I’ve already shown, a perfectly sensible notion of ‘moral realism’ which does not require 
that there are ‘universal, non-contingent, moral principles’. I think that is, anyway, much more 
plausible, because that renders moral claims responsive to facts about this world.. The central flaw of 
Argument 2, then, is its endorsement of P9. Argument 2 is therefore not successful.  
Section 3: Argument 3 
“According to the adaptive link [non-truth-tracking] account […] making such [moral] 
judgments contributed to reproductive success not because they were true or false, but 
rather because they got our ancestors to respond to their circumstances with behavior 
that itself promoted reproductive success[…] (Street 2006, 126)” 
“Thus, the adaptive link account explains the widespread presence of certain values in 
the human population more parsimoniously, without any need to posit a role for 
evaluative truth. (Street 2006, 126f)” 
“The evolutionary explanation makes the objective morality redundant, for even if 
external ethical premises did not exist, we would go on thinking about right and wrong in 
the way that we do […] surely redundancy is the last predicate that an objective morality 
can possess (Ruse and Wilson 1986, 187)” 
“[…] everything of importance to us, including […] our ethical beliefs, is the product of 
mindless purposeless forces […] importance is explainable without residue in terms of 
mindless purposefulness. And if there is no residue left to explain, we can answer the 
challenge of the anti-Darwinian, “You’ll never explain this!” […] at least to our own 
Darwinian satisfaction. There is nothing left of morality to explain (Sommers and 
Rosenberg 2003, 667)” 
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P1. ‘Moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is epistemological and ontological moral 
realism. 
P11. Moral realists must either believe that all our moral beliefs are probably false or 
they must believe that our ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable (‘truth-tracking’) 
P12. A moral realist would not accept that all of our moral beliefs are probably false 
C4. Moral realists must believe P2 which is that “the ‘moral method’ depends crucially 
on the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are, in some cases, and to some degree, 
‘epistemically reliable’” 
P13. Either our ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable (truth-tracking-moral-
nativist-hypothesis) or they are not (non-truth-tracking-moral-nativist-hypothesis)  
P14. The non-truth-tracking-moral-nativist-hypothesis and the truth-tracking-moral-
nativist-hypothesis explain the data equally well, but the former is more parsimonious 
P15. The non-truth-tracking-moral-nativist hypothesis is the better explanation. 
C5. Probably our ‘moral intuitions’ are not epistemically reliable (probably they do not 
track the moral truth) 
C6. Probably there is no moral truth at all 
C7. Therefore, probably moral realism is false.  
The version of the argument I am presenting as Argument 3 is, in truth, a combination of two different 
kinds of arguments. Both arguments exploit the conjunction of the correctness of a non-truth-tracking-
moral-nativist hypothesis and the principle of parsimony. Rosenberg, Sommers, Joyce, Ruse and 
Wilson, however, assume, or assert, that this hypothesis is correct, Street, on the other hand, presents 
an argument in its favour. Before turning to the details of this argument, let me say a few words about 
how best to view it.  
I have established P1. The inference from P11 and P12 to C4 is fairly straightforward and is taken 
from Street’s construal of the problem. She argues basically that it would be unacceptable to a moral 
realists to endorse the first disjunct of P11 and that they must therefore endorse the second disjunct. 
C4, then, is a restatement of P2, which emphasizes that a moral realist must accept it for the sake of 
their realism. I have argued for P2 differently, but I don’t think that should affect the argument here. 
P1, P11, P12 and C4 are justified.  
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Let me turn to Street’s argument. She begins by noting that moral realists must take a position on the 
relationship between objective moral facts, on the on hand, and the natural selective forces which 
have shaped our ‘moral intuitions’, on the other hand. Moral realists must either accept that there is 
some relation, or deny that there is one, and Street argues that neither position has a favourable result 
for the realist (Street 2006, 121).  
If there is no relation between the realist’s allegations that there are moral truths and the evolutionary 
development of our ‘moral intuitions’, then it is highly unlikely that any of our moral beliefs are true. 
If any of our ‘moral intuitions’ are accurate this is simply accidental. I provided an elaborate quotation 
of her position here in Chapter 3. So, if there is no relation between the two, then we must suppose 
that probably all of our ‘moral intuitions’ are false. (Street 2006, 121f). 
If there is a relation between the two then the realist must give us an account of the relationship. The 
realist must, then, propose that our ‘moral intuitions’ are truth-tracking (i.e. that it was adaptive for 
our evolutionary ancestors to have epistemically reliable ‘moral intuitions’ (Street 2006, 126)) (Street 
2006, 125). She says, “According to this hypothesis, our ability to recognize [moral] truths […] 
conferred upon us certain advantages that helped us flourish and reproduce[…]  the evaluative 
judgments that it proved most selectively advantageous to make [so, also the ‘moral intuitions’ it 
proved most advantageous to have] are, in general, precisely those evaluative judgments which are 
true. (Street 2006, 125)” 
She suggests that this is an empirical hypothesis about the nature of the evolutionary development of 
our moral capacities (I call it the truth-tracking-moral-nativist-hypothesis). It may therefore be 
evaluated along similar lines to other empirical hypotheses (Street 2006, 126).  
She believes that the truth-tracking account is less parsimonious than its competitor, the non-truth-
tracking-moral-nativist-hypothesis. She explains, “The [truth-tracking-moral-nativist-hypothesis] 
obviously posits something extra that the [non-truth-tracking-moral-nativist-hypothesis] does not, 
namely, independent [moral] truths […] The [non-truth-tracking-moral-nativist-hypothesis], in 
contrast, makes no reference whatsoever to [moral] truth; rather it explains the advantage of making 
certain evaluative judgments directly, by pointing out how they got creatures who made them to act in 
ways that tended to promote reproductive success. Thus the [non-truth-tracking-moral-nativist-
hypothesis] explains the widespread presence of certain values in the human population more 
parsimoniously, without any need to posit a role for [moral] truth (Street 2006, 126f).” 
The non-truth-tracking hypothesis adequately explains how and why our moral capacities developed 
without supposing that they developed because of (or, while ‘guided towards’) moral truths (we also 
saw this in Street’s explanation featured in Chapter 3). As such the non-truth-tracking hypothesis 
commits itself to less (it is simpler, more parsimonious) while explaining the target phenomenon 
49 
 
equally well. Insofar as simplicity and parsimony are explanatory virtues of an empirical hypothesis, 
the non-truth-tracking-hypothesis is the better explanation (Street 2006, 129). Thus stands Street’s 
arguments in favour of P13, P14 and P15.  
I think that P13 is acceptable. It may be read as the view that it is possible that our ‘moral intuitions’ 
are not epistemically reliable. Of course, that is correct, and if it is, then we may ask whether or not 
they, in fact, are. P15 is an implication of P14 and the principle of parsimony. Clearly, also, the non-
truth-tracking-hypothesis is more parsimonious and, on an adaptationist view, exhaustively explains 
the target data. P15 is acceptable if P14 is. We have seen, through Chapters 2 and 3 that, so long as 
one does not countenance occult forces, our moral capacities are amenable to scientific investigation. 
An account of the nature of our moral capacities then may be fairly regarded as an empirical account. 
If realists must suppose that our ‘moral intuitions’ were developed to be truth-sensitive, then they are 
proposing an empirical hypothesis of sorts. I think, then, that we have good reasons to accept P13, 
P14 and P15.  
Ruse and Wilson suggest, then, that if we take seriously the non-truth-tracking-moral-nativist 
hypothesis (as most appear to (Joyce 2013, 3)), we find that all reference to ‘moral truth’ is rendered 
redundant (Ruse and Wilson 1986, 187). We believe that our ‘moral intuitions’ reflect moral truths 
because such a belief was beneficial to our evolutionary ancestors (Ruse and Wilson 1986, 179).  
As Rosenberg and Sommers explain, if our best explanation of why people believe that P does not 
require that P is true, then there aren’t grounds for believing that P is true (Sommers and Rosenberg 
2003, 666). This, Ruse and Wilson argue, lends credence to the idea that there simply aren’t any 
objective moral truths for our ‘moral intuitions’ and judgments to reflect (Ruse and Wilson 1986, 
186). That is, given that we can explain our moral capacities without reference to the truth, and 
reference to truth is redundant, and there is nothing left of our moral capacities to explain, then likely 
there is no truth to which our moral capacities could, but fail to, connect. 
The inference from P15-C5 is acceptable. If we are justified in believing our best account of our 
‘moral intuitions’, then probably our ‘moral intuitions’ aren’t epistemically reliable. This, in 
conjunction with P1 and C4 shows that ‘epistemological moral realism’ is false. It is not clear what 
justifies C6, it may be the result of overzealous statements made by Rosenberg, Ruse et al. 
Nevertheless, given C6, C5 and P1, C7 follows; (epistemological and ontological) ‘moral realism’ is 
probably false.   
Joyce, however, raises some concerns with the principle of parsimony. He argues that what does the 
work for the principle of parsimony in this argument is the implicit belief that ‘moral truths’ are 
radically unlike any naturally explicable truths, least not those which would have been relevant to our 
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evolutionary ancestors (Joyce 2013, 6). Perhaps at work here is a more hidden endorsement of the 
view that genuine moral truths are non-natural.  
Joyce suggests that Utilitarians, for example, take moral truths to relate primarily to claims about 
human happiness. He suggests that it is not so clear that the principle of parsimony alone, without 
further argument, can suggest that our ‘moral intuitions’ do not track truths about human happiness 
and, if Utilitarians are correct, then the principle of parsimony alone cannot suggest that our ‘moral 
intuitions’ do not track some kind of moral truth (Joyce 2013, 6).  
After all, we have seen that our morally salient emotions – one of which is happiness – also serve an 
evolutionary function: to motivate us toward further cooperative and altruistic behaviours. Nothing 
presented thus far seems to rule out that Utilitarianism cannot be rendered compatible with the 
evolutionary data. In this case we would be incorrect to regard our ‘moral intuitions’ (generally) as 
failing to track any moral truths. This, at least, renders P14 and P15 problematic.  
I take issue with what seems to be the inference from C5 to C6. The move from the view that our 
‘moral intuitions’ are probably not truth-tracking, to the view that there probably is no truth to track 
seems to be unwarranted within the context of this argument. Nothing in what these authors have said 
suggests that it is impossible that even if our ‘moral intuitions’ did not track any moral truths, there 
could still be a realm of moral truths. C6 does not seem justified, and, as such, C7 does not follow.  
I do not believe that Joyce’s problems render P14 and P15 unacceptable. I offer independent 
arguments for those premises, and deal with the issue in the next chapter as well. Tentatively, then, I 
think that this argument gives us fair reasons to accept C5, and as such to accept the view that 
epistemological moral realism is false. Formally, Argument 3 is not successful, since its main 
conclusion (C7) does not follow. Nevertheless it is successful up to C5 and this is certainly damaging 
for the moral realist enterprise.  
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Section 4: Argument 4 
P1. ‘Moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is epistemological and ontological moral 
realism. 
P2. The ‘moral method’ depends crucially on the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are, in 
some cases, and to some degree, ‘epistemically reliable’ 
C8. Moral realism (traditionally construed) is unjustified if our ‘moral intuitions’ are not 
epistemically reliable 
P16. Probably our ‘moral intuitions’ are not, to any degree, in any cases, epistemically 
reliable 
P17. Moral realism may remain plausible insofar as there is a moral methodology which 
can motivate realism without relying on the epistemic reliability of our ‘moral intuitions’.  
P18. There is no alternative methodology 
C9. Moral realism (traditionally construed) is unjustified 
C10. Moral realism (traditionally construed) is implausible 
P1 and P2 have been argued for in Chapter 1. P16 is the equivalent of C5 from Argument 3. I think 
that Street et al have provided us with good reasons to accept this premise. Evolutionary science 
explains that the referents of our ‘moral intuitions’ are facts about evolutionarily stable strategies for 
solving the contingent adaptive challenges faced by our evolutionary ancestors. These relate 
principally to whatever would have better conduced to survival and reproduction of individual Homo 
sapiens. Unless there is an argument to suggest that these scientifically explicable referents are 
identical with moral truths (and I argue in the next chapter that traditional moralist realists do not have 
such an argument), it must be accepted that our ‘moral intuitions’ do not track moral truths.  
Even if we do not accept this adaptationist view of our ‘moral intuitions’, given P6 established in 
Chapters 2 and 3 we have good reasons nevertheless to regard our ‘moral intuitions’ as the direct or 
indirect product of evolutionary forces. Taking the view that they are spandrels is to take one horn of 
Street’s dilemma previously reviewed. Taking that view renders it highly unlikely that our ‘moral 
intuitions’ are epistemically reliable, and gives us no good reasons to put our faith in their epistemic 
reliability. Adaptationist or not, P16 is acceptable.  
If we were to assume C8, P17 and P18 then C9 and C10 follow, given that the other premises are 
justified. So let us turn to those premises. C8 is an inference of P1, P2 and the view, established in 
Chapter 1, that moral realists employ the ‘moral method’.  
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Let me describe the logical structure of the inference. 
Let ‘M’ be ‘moral realism’. 
‘O’ is ‘ontological moral realism’ 
‘E’ is ‘epistemological moral realism’ 
‘I’ is that our ‘‘moral intuitions’ are (ceteris paribus) epistemically reliable’ 
 
If [M is identical with (O&E)], and [if E then O], and [if not-I then not-E]  
We can infer that [if not-I, then not (O&E)] 
Therefore if [not-I then not-M]. 
I want to get across that there is some kind of dependence relation between ontological and 
epistemological moral realism, in which epistemological moral realism is, in some sense, logically 
prior to ontological moral realism. Further, I believe that epistemological moral realism depends on 
the (ceteris paribus) epistemic reliability of our ‘moral intuitions’. Since ‘moral realism’ is 
epistemological and ontological moral realism then if our ‘moral intuitions’ are not epistemically 
reliable then ‘moral realism’ is false.   
P17 is essentially the claim that it is possible that epistemological moral realism does not depend on 
the ‘moral method’ (if there is another, better, method, then moral realism need not be false). P18 is 
the claim that actually moral realism does depend on the moral method. If these premises hold, and if 
the inference principle from P1-C8 holds, then C9 and C10 are acceptable.  
I believe that much of the work done in Chapter 1 is sufficient to establish these claims. I did this in 
three ways which I will now make explicit. Firstly the subtext of Chapter 1 was meant to suggest, in a 
broad fashion, that no matter the particulars of the methodology used, whether for the purposes of 
justifying ethical or metaethical claims, the ‘moral method’ was employed. I showed that historically 
and contemporarily, particular moral claims are justified by employing the moral method. This was 
the case whether we considered the straightforward intuitionism of Ross and Moore, or whether we 
considered the more elaborate methods of Daniels and Boyd. Clearly then ‘epistemological moral 
realism’, or, more particularly, our belief that we have, or could have, some kind of moral knowledge, 
depends on the ‘moral method’.  
We saw in the discussion about the ‘presumption of moral realism’ that the ontological portion of 
moral realism (that there are objective moral facts) is also justified by this method. The discussion 
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about the ‘disputation of moral realism’ (and its parallels with scientific realism) makes this clearer. 
Boyd believes, much in the spirit of Ross and Moore, that we are warranted in accepting a realist 
perspective regarding moral values because we are able to discover genuinely true moral theories or 
claims. Ontological moral realism for Boyd is justified by the success of the ‘moral method’. This is 
quite sensible. After all, if we regard our ‘moral intuitions’ as epistemically reliable we commit 
ourselves to the view that there are facts for them (to some degree, in some cases) to reliably reflect.  
This all goes to suggest that it is the (ceteris paribus) reliability of our ‘moral intuitions’ which 
justifies our moral claims and theories, and our ontological views about such claims and theories, and 
which commits us to epistemological and ontological moral realism. Our ontological views depend in 
some way on our epistemological views. If we have epistemic access to moral facts then there are 
moral facts to which we could, and do, have epistemic access. Our belief in that claim depends 
entirely on the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ (ceteris paribus) are epistemically reliable. That is a 
belief held, in various ways, with various strengths of conviction, by all moral realists in the literature 
under review – hence why I refer to it as a condition of ‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed).  
If our ‘moral intuitions’ are not (ceteris paribus) epistemically reliable ‘moral realism’ traditionally 
construed is implausible because its plausibility (as well as its formal justification) depends on our 
‘moral intuitions’ being (ceteris paribus) epistemically reliable.  
I used an analogy about ‘Religion X’ and ‘Book Y’ at the beginning of Chapter 1 to say, in brief, what 
I have just covered. There is another analogy regarding empiricism and the view that our sensory 
modalities are not (ceteris paribus) epistemically reliable. We believe that we can gain knowledge 
about the external world because we have some (meagre) contact with it through our senses. Our 
belief in an external world is plausible because of the alleged reliability of our senses. If, however, it 
was revealed to us (say, by some infallible revelation) that our senses are not epistemically reliable at 
all this would not only take away our justification for our belief in the external world, but also render 
the view that there is an external world highly improbable. The only reason we believe in such a 
world to begin with is because that is what our senses suggest, and we regard our senses as (ceteris 
paribus) epistemically reliable. If they turn out not to be, and if we have no other reasons for believing 
in the external world, then the view that there is one would be rendered very implausible.  
Both analogies bring out what I have argued for regarding ‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed) 
and the (ceteris paribus) reliability of our ‘moral intuitions’. If we have reasons to believe that our 
‘moral intuitions’ aren’t epistemically reliable at all then ‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is 
rendered implausible if there are no other reasons for adopting ‘moral realism’. I believe I have 
justified C8.  
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P17 should now seem less controversial. If ‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is motivated by 
anything other than the (ceteris paribus) reliability of our ‘moral intuitions’ then we may not conclude 
that ‘moral realism’ is implausible. As I have just explained, and as I demonstrated in Chapter 1, 
among moral realists (historically and contemporarily) there is no alternative motivation. From the 
literature under review there is no alternative to the ‘moral method’. As I showed in Chapter 1 
whichever of the various methodologies moral realists use, they each rely, to some degree, on the 
‘moral method’. P18, then, is also justified. As such, C9 and C10 follow. ‘Moral realism’ 
(traditionally construed) is rendered implausible by considerations (as we saw earlier in this Chapter, 
and in Chapters 2 and 3) from evolutionary science and evolutionary naturalism.  
Section 5: Closing Remarks 
I have assessed 4 arguments which attempt to confirm Singers fears expressed in the previous 
Chapter. If we take seriously the claims of evolutionary science, in conjunction with evolutionary 
naturalism, we must accept some form of moral anti-realism. The first 3 of these arguments are taken 
from the literature under review. I have argued that they are not successful. The 4
th
 argument is, I have 
argued, successful. If Argument 4 is sound, and there are good reasons to think it is, then evolutionary 
science in conjunction with evolutionary naturalism renders ‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed) 
implausible.  
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Chapter 5 
Responses to Evolutionary Debunking Arguments 
Section 1: Rejecting Evolutionary Naturalism 
 As indicated in P7, Koukl thinks that it is an uncontroversial datum that there are objective moral 
facts, and that these facts are non-natural facts (Koukl 1998, 6). Rea expresses similar sympathies. He 
believes that it is an important part of our common sense view of the world that there are objective 
moral facts. Both also endorse P8. Unlike Rosenberg, they think that insofar as naturalism fails to 
accommodate this datum, naturalism fails to capture a real aspect of the world. On these grounds they 
believe that naturalism is rendered implausible, and that we may accept moral realism (Rea 2006, 1).  
This amounts to a rejection of P16. Evolutionary science does not seem to suggest that our ‘moral 
intuitions’ are epistemically reliable (I’ve argued for this in Chapters 3 and 4). But Rea and Koukl’s 
‘common sense’ tells us that they are, to some degree, in some cases, epistemically reliable. If we 
accept their claim then, there is more to our ‘moral intuitions’ than can be scientifically explained. 
Naturalism cannot accommodate this ‘extra feature’, so naturalism must be incorrect. Regardless of 
what evolutionary science tells us, it does not, therefore, give us the full story. We therefore do not 
have grounds to reject moral realism.   
The main problem for this argument is this. The ‘common sense’ (another label for our ‘moral 
intuitions’, as indicated in Chapter 1) on which this objection relies can be given an exhaustive 
evolutionary explanation in which its truth does not feature. We have seen, through Chapters 2 and 3, 
that evolutionary science indicates that our ‘moral intuitions’ are not epistemically reliable. As noted 
previously, this is the case whether or not we regard our ‘moral intuitions’ as adaptations. The 
available data indicates that we are not justified in regarding our ‘moral intuitions’ as accurate when 
they suggest to us that there are objective moral truths. As noted in Chapter 4, evolutionary science 
undercuts the presumption of moral realism (discussed in Chapter 1) of which this objection seems to 
be a recital.   
These realists, then, must rely on the mere assertion that evolutionary science doesn’t exhaustively 
explain our ‘moral intuitions’, directly or indirectly, and that there is an extra factor. However, that is 
to commit oneself to a position which, given the available data, is unjustified. As we saw in Chapters 
2 and 3, whether or not one is an evolutionary naturalist we have good reasons to follow the findings 
of evolutionary science. As I argued in Chapter 4 there is nothing in ‘moral realism’ (traditionally 
construed) which requires that we regard moral facts as non-natural. There are, then, good reasons to 
find this objection to be unsuccessful.  
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If one, however, disregards those arguments, and takes a stand on the issue and declares that one is a 
non-naturalist, and that moral truths are non-natural truths, then what this objection demonstrates is 
the incompatibility between the conjunction of evolutionary science and evolutionary naturalism, and 
moral realism.  
Section 2: Our ‘Moral Intuitions’ Are Epistemically Reliable 
Copp (2008) suggests that we are still capable of moral knowledge even if our ‘moral intuitions’ have 
an evolutionary explanation (Tropman 2013, 5). Copp advocates a moral position which is called the 
‘society-centred theory’. According to his theory a moral code is authoritative for some society if it 
enables that society to best meet its ends. Societal needs may include physical continuity, peace, and 
social cooperation. Social cooperation, say, is right because cooperation allows members of the 
society to better meet their needs than if they failed to cooperate. Copp interprets this realistically: 
what makes a normative claim correct is if it in fact helps the society in which it features to meet its 
needs. Such facts about what best supports social needs exist quite independently of people’s beliefs 
and attitudes about those facts (Tropman 2013, 5).  
Now, if Copp is correct, and morality is essentially concerned with satisfying the needs of society, 
then, given what we know of our evolutionary history, it is likely that there will be some overlap 
between our evolved moral capacities and the moral facts (Tropman 2013, 5). As such, P13 is 
incorrect. At least some of the time we can expect our ‘moral intuitions’ to be epistemically reliable, 
given the ‘society-centred theory’.  
My concerns with this objection are similar to Street’s, who argues that Copp begs the question 
against the anti-realists (Tropman 2013, 6). Street correctly identifies that the force behind this 
objection resides in Copp’s suggestion that his society-centred theory is correct. Given its correctness, 
one can plausibly suggest that some of our ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable despite their 
evolutionary development. I don’t think that Copp can show that his society-centred theory is correct, 
however, without begging the question. As such, Copp cannot show that some of our ‘moral 
intuitions’ are epistemically reliable without begging the question. 
I believe that Copp faces a dilemma: he must answer the question, “what justifies the society-centred 
theory?” He may (Option 1) respond by citing certain intuitively plausible moral considerations, or 
showing that some fundamental moral principle which features in his theory is intuitively obvious. Or 
perhaps he might suggest that failing to believe some feature of his theory is highly implausible since 
it is highly counter intuitive. Alternatively he might (Option 2) fail to give any justification for his 
position, and just assert that it is true.  
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Option 2 is obviously unappealing. If this is the option he takes, then he provides us with no reasons 
to accept his view. Further he provides us with no reasons not to endorse another moral theory with 
different moral principles. 
Without any reasons for accepting his view, he provides no reasons for accepting that some of our 
‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable. Further, we may, with as much justification, assert some 
contrived view such that morality is really about being as cruel as possible to each other. In Copp’s 
case our some of ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable. In the contrived case most of our ‘moral 
intuitions’ aren’t epistemically reliable. But, under Option 2, Copp gives us no reason to suppose that 
his case is the right one. Taking Option 2, then cannot demonstrate that some of our ‘moral intuitions’ 
are epistemically reliable.  
Option 1 is much more appealing. It is, more or less, how we ordinarily argue for our moral positions. 
However, in taking Option 1Copp is assuming that what he finds (even at a very fundamental level) to 
be intuitively plausible is evidence that it is likely true. That is, in taking Option 1 he is assuming the 
view that at least some of his ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable.  
This, however, is precisely what is in question, and the anti-realist has provided us with plausible 
reasons to think that our ‘moral intuitions’ are not epistemically reliable (Tropman 2013, 6). The only 
way that Copp can argue for his position is by begging the question. Since this cannot be accepted, 
Copp does not give us a reason to suppose that some of our ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically 
reliable. Copp’s objection is not successful.  
Tropman notes that this kind of argument, as well as the response that it is question begging, can be 
generalized to other conceptions of morality as well (Tropman 2013, 6). We saw in Chapter 1 that our 
moral theorizing depends on the ‘moral method’, which centrally features the view that some of our 
‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable. As such, any moral theory justified by this kind of 
method will beg the question.   
Section 3: It Doesn’t Matter That Our ‘Moral Intuitions’ Aren’t Truth Tracking (1) 
The following argument, presented by Weilenberg, is similar to Copp’s. I believe that it shares a 
similar degree of promise. Copp’s objection is premised on an allegedly successful argument for some 
moral position. As I showed, we cannot accept this because it begs the question. The following 
objection essentially takes up the second (Option 2) of the dilemma I presented for Copp’s position. 
Instead of presenting some moral position believed to be correct, it simply assumes that some moral 
position is correct, and argues from there.   
Weilenberg seeks to show that it is false that because there is an evolutionary explanation for our 
‘moral intuitions’ (the best interpretation of which suggests that our ‘moral intuitions’ are not truth 
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tracking), then probably none of our moral beliefs (developed from our ‘moral intuitions’) are 
justified (Weilenberg 2010, 1). He argues that, assuming that some moral claims are true, and given a 
reliabilist conception of warrant, even given an evolutionary explanation of our ‘moral intuitions’ we 
do have moral knowledge. This is the denial of P16 because P16 does not follow, he claims, from the 
moral nativist hypothesis.  
Weilenberg centres on the belief that we have certain rights, one of which is to bodily integrity and so 
to not being tortured for entertainment (Weilenberg 2010, 5), and he admits freely that this is an 
assumption (Weilenberg 2010, 8).  He notes that having capacities to form such judgments (say, that it 
is wrong if I am arbitrarily tortured by others) would be plausibly fitness enhancing.  
What he intends here is it would have been fitness enhancing for our evolutionary ancestors to pay 
special attention to their bodily integrity, and to view it as wrong (and therefore to be avoided) if our 
bodily integrity is violated. He supposes that having capacities to form such beliefs about the value of 
our own bodies could be behind our more contemporary beliefs in ‘rights’.  
He claims that having such capacities can be explained by evolution without the added hypothesis that 
we really do have rights of this kind. What is normally concluded from this is that we have no 
justification to believe in the correctness of our ‘moral intuitions’, even if our ‘moral intuitions’ are in 
fact correct and we do have such rights. He wishes to argue that if we take a reliabilist approach to 
warrant, then it can be shown, on the assumption that there are such moral truths, that we can be 
justified in regarding our ‘moral intuitions’ regarding rights as correct.  
Weilenberg suggests that if some belief is produced by a reliable process, that it is so produced can 
grant us warrant, sufficient for knowledge, in regarding that belief as true (Weilenberg 2010, 9). What 
Weilenberg wants to get across is that natural selection is likely to select belief forming capacities 
which are epistemically reliable. Weilenberg cites the work by Carruthers who argues that it is likely 
that if evolutionary processes are instrumental in the development of belief forming capacities, then 
they will produce reliably accurate belief forming capacities (Weilenberg 2010, 12).  
There are two reasons in support of this. One is that it is more evolutionarily beneficial, generally 
speaking, if the beliefs from which we act are true beliefs. Another is that there are certain belief 
forming capacities, such as those of perception and memory, which are generally reliable (Weilenberg 
2010, 12).  
Presumably with the aid of an implicit argument from analogy Weilenberg reasons that if 
evolutionarily developed belief forming capacities are reliable, so too must be our moral belief 
forming capacities (Weilenberg 2010, 12). So, if we have rights and if we are disposed to think that 
we have rights because of evolutionary forces, we have justification to regard our beliefs in rights as 
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accurate. If some (moral) belief is produced by a reliable process (in this case, belief forming 
mechanisms developed by natural selection), and if that (moral) belief is true, then we have warrant to 
regard the (moral) belief as true, and we have (moral) knowledge.  
This is another way of blunting the force of the claim that our ‘moral intuitions’ are not epistemically 
reliable. The claim is this. Perhaps our ‘moral intuitions’ were not developed by mechanisms which 
were truth-sensitive. Nevertheless, if there is some moral truth, because evolution is generally reliable, 
we can regard our moral capacities as reliable. Since reliability in belief production is all that is 
required for warrant, even if our ‘moral intuitions’ were not developed by truth-sensitive mechanisms, 
we are still warranted (given the reality of certain moral truths) in regarding our moral beliefs as true. 
Evolutionary science, then, does not show that we have no reason to believe that any of our moral 
beliefs are true, and as such does not even suggest that moral realism is unjustified.  
I will not discuss the epistemological issues regarding reliabilism. I also will not discuss Weilenberg’s 
use of Carruthers’ position on the reliability of evolutionarily developed belief forming mechanisms. I 
believe both points to be controversial, but I can grant them to Weilenberg for the sake of argument. 
Rather I want to take issue with his assumption that we do have rights, and in particular, rights to 
bodily integrity.  
What does the work for Weilenberg’s case is neither his reliabilism nor his view on the reliability of 
evolutionarily developed belief forming mechanisms. It is not even that there is some moral truth. 
Rather that there are particular moral truths; particularly, those truths which happen to be compatible 
with our ‘moral intuitions’. Unless Weilenberg can give us a reason to suppose that the particular 
moral truths are the ones which comport with our intuitions, Weilenberg has not demonstrated very 
much, and I believe he falls prey to Option 2 of the dilemma I earlier posed to Copp. 
He has demonstrated just that if there are moral truths to which our intuitions comport, and if we are 
reliabilist, then we can still be moral realists. Or, more deflationary still, that moral realism is possible 
given certain conditions. I take it that this was not in question. What is in question is whether, given 
what we can reasonably believe, we have sufficient warrant to believe that moral realism is correct. It 
looks as if we do not. 
Weilenberg would benefit from giving us some independently plausible reasons for thinking that there 
were moral truths, or that we do have rights to bodily integrity. Doing that, however, would land him 
in Copp’s position regarding the question begging problem of Option 1. He opted for Option 2, which 
I have shown is also unfavourable. As such, Weilenberg’s objection is also unsuccessful.   
Section 4: It Doesn’t Matter That Our ‘Moral Intuitions’ Aren’t Truth Tracking (2). 
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Like Weilenberg, FitzPatrick argues that despite our ‘moral intuitions’ being epistemically unreliable, 
this does not diminish the justification for moral realism (FitzPatrick 2013, 2). He accepts the non-
truth-tracking-moral-nativist hypothesis (FitzPatrick 2013, 7). He does not believe that this alone 
shows moral realism to be unjustified. He thinks that all that follows from accepting that hypothesis is 
that we should not expect our basic ‘moral intuitions’ to track moral truths. It does not follow, he 
thinks, that we cannot bolster our bare moral capacities by training these capacities in “cultural 
contexts in such a way that we can […] exercise them reliably to track moral truths accurately and 
arrive at justified moral beliefs (FitzPatrick 2013, 9)”.  
His argument, in general, is the following. Just as long as our claims to moral knowledge are not 
logically dependent only on our (inaccurate) ‘moral intuitions’, there is no real problem presented by 
the fact that we have inaccurate ‘moral intuitions’ (FitzPatrick 2013, 9). Some of our moral beliefs 
may be directly linked to our ‘moral intuitions’, and we can expect these to be inaccurate, but many of 
them are not. Many of them are beliefs which we have arrived at through a process of critical 
reasoning, in conjunction with other factual and theoretical considerations (FitzPatrick 2013, 12).  
I think that FitzPatrick is correct, as far as he goes. The standalone claim that our ‘moral intuitions’ 
are not epistemically reliable does not entail anti-realism. And certainly many of our beliefs are not 
directly related to our ‘moral intuitions’, many of them are highly complex, and the result of complex 
processes of reasoning. 
I do not think, however, that his considerations address the problem at hand. The problem is that a 
central aspect of the methodology of moral realists (the ‘moral method’) does dependent on the view 
that our ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable. While many of our moral beliefs are predicated 
on complex processes of reasoning and reflection, central to those processes is the presupposition that 
certain basic ‘moral intuitions’ are accurate. As Singer pointed out, our moral inquiry requires some 
minimal reliance on ‘moral intuitions’, without which, Singer thinks, moral scepticism or nihilism 
becomes unavoidable (Singer 2005, 349). If that central presupposition is false then regardless of the 
complexity of our reasoning processes they are unlikely to be capable of developing moral 
knowledge.  
FitzPatrick says, “If there is a special problem for the domain of ethics [to employ some theoretical 
considerations, rather than simply relying on our bare ‘moral intuitions’], it would have to be because 
for some reason we cannot […] develop and train the various capacities bequeathed by natural 
selection in order to conduct successful inquiry into ethical facts (FitzPatrick 2013, 9)”.  
I would not go so far as to suggest that we cannot develop such a method., but simply to point out that 
in fact so far we have not. So far, the methods used to justify our moral beliefs, however complex they 
are, rely at some level on the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable. FitzPatrick 
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accepts that they are not, and so must accept that this undermines moral realism in the way that 
Argument 4 suggests it does. If not, then he is forced to beg the question against the anti-realist by 
presupposing the veracity of ‘our moral intuitions’ in endorsing some complex moral methodology. 
Neither option is favourable for the moral realist. This objection, too, is not successful.  
Section 5: Closing Remarks 
I have considered an objection to evolutionary naturalism and I have suggested that it is not strong 
enough to discredit the anti-realist argument. I’ve considered three further arguments, each of which 
has been shown to be unsuccessful for a quite simple reason: they are question begging. 
The basic problem, as I said before, is that moral realists are reliant on a particular methodology, one 
of the central tenets of which is false. Without any other methodology, there are no arguments that 
realists can marshal which justify their position. The very foundation of their enterprise is in question, 
and they cannot rely on those foundations in attempting to justify them. I conclude that Argument 4 
from Chapter 4 holds: evolutionary naturalism in conjunction with evolutionary science renders moral 
realism implausible.  
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Chapter 6 
Defending Moral Realism (Non-Traditionally Construed) 
Section 1: Harms’ Teleosemantics 
Harms has provided an argument which he believes renders moral realism both compatible with and 
underwritten by evolutionary science. I do not agree wholeheartedly with his position, my own view 
is slightly different. Nevertheless, my view can be seen as a variation on his. Let me then begin by 
detailing Harms view. Thereafter I’ll highlight what I take issue with. Then I’ll provide my response 
to it.  
Harms wishes to employ a particular theory of meaning (he refers primarily to Milikan’s 
‘biosemantics’ or ‘teleosemantics’ (Harms 2000, 701)) in which the truth conditions of some 
utterance (or ‘signal’) are determined by that utterances (or ‘signals’) evolutionary function (Harms 
2000, 701). The evolutionary function of a trait is the reason why that trait was selected (Joyce 2013, 
2).  
Harms believes that this will allow us to countenance true and false moral statements and that it is 
possible that the truth conditions of such moral statements can be scientifically explicable (Harms 
2000, 702). This will show that moral realism is not ruled out by evolutionary science; rather that 
evolutionary science, in conjunction with some particular theory of meaning, supports moral realism 
of a special kind (Harms 2000, 701). 
He explains that if some trait is an ‘adaptation’ (so, it has an evolutionary function) then that trait is 
capable of ‘malfunction’. If the function is the reason the trait was selected, the malfunction is a 
failure to perform in those ways (Harms 2000, 703). Harms thinks that the proper function of an 
adaptation is an objective matter of fact. That is, the function of some adaptation is not determined by 
our opinions, beliefs or desires, but rather by the actual evolutionary history operative during the 
selection of some trait (Harms 2000, 703). 
Harms utilizes a study (conducted by Cheney and Seyfarth (1990)) in which a signalling system of 
Kenyan vervet monkeys is detailed to get his general point across. From that general point he will 
draw conclusions about the particular case of morality. Harms focuses on one of three environmental 
threats faced by these monkeys. If there are leopards close by, then the monkeys will climb up a tree, 
eliciting a particular cry. The rest of the troop responds appropriately to this distinctive cry (the 
‘signal’) by exercising the appropriate avoidance behavior (Harms 2000, 705).  
If we call the cry elicited by the threat of the leopard the ‘A’ signal then ‘A’ is true when there is, in 
fact, a leopard in the vicinity. ‘A’ is false if there is no leopard there. The truth conditions for ‘A’ are 
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determined by the historical conditions for the correct functioning of the signalling system (Harms 
2000, 705).  
If the signalling system evolved as a result of some environmental pressure (say, leopards are threats 
to the survival of vervet monkeys, the ‘A’ signal is an adaptation which allows the monkeys to avoid 
the threat), then the conditions for correct functioning of that signal system are given by its 
evolutionary explanation. In particular, the signalling system is functioning (the A signal is true) when 
it occurs because of the detection of a leopard, and it malfunctions (the A signal is false) when it 
occurs despite there being no leopard.  
I only agree with the first of two points Harms wants to get across. Firstly, adaptive signalling systems 
do have objective truth conditions for the production of the signals. The objective truth conditions are 
whether the adaptation fulfils its evolutionary function. As such, insofar as the human moral 
capacities are adaptations and utilize signalling systems of some kind, there are objective truth 
conditions for our moral claims and utterances (Harms 2000, 707).   
Secondly, there are objective truth conditions for such signals even if those signals lack propositional 
content. What is at issue is not whether the propositional content of some signal is true, but whether 
the signal itself fulfils its evolutionary function. Consequently, our moral language may also have 
objective truth conditions even if such language lacks propositional content. He says, “what is at issue 
is not whether or not moral language can be translated into scientific language […], but whether there 
exist objective standards for the correct issuance of moral claims and imperatives […](Harms 2000, 
707)”.  
He explains that it is not required that there is some separate realm of moral facts in order for moral 
statements to be true. By employing his version of teleosemantics he has shown that all that is 
required for this is that ‘morality’ is an adaptation, and that its evolutionary function requires eliciting 
certain kinds of signals to which other actors can make particular responses in particular kinds of 
circumstances (Harms 2000, 707).  
He explains, “My statement, “you shouldn’t do that” is morally true if the issuance of this fulfils at 
least my end of the function of the moral regulatory system (Harms 2000, 707).” This is all that is 
required to justify a “realist attitude” (in which we regard our moral claims as capable of being 
objectively true or false) toward morality.  
So, he believes that he has restored promise in ‘moral realism’ because he has shown that moral 
objectivity is not an ‘illusion’ (as, for instance, Ruse believes). Moral objectivity is just a matter of 
correctly fulfilling the evolutionary functions of our moral faculties. Evolutionary science does not 
support moral anti-realism; rather it underwrites a particular kind of moral realism.  
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Section 2: Evolutionary Functions and ‘Moral Truth’ 
I endorse the first point in the following sense. I agree that if we can speak about an evolutionary 
function of some trait, then we can speak also about is malfunction. This gives us the minimal 
capacity to say when a trait is ‘correctly’, ‘properly’, or ‘rightly’ functioning, and when it is not. 
I don’t agree with the second point. As we saw in Chapter 1, moral realism involves the view that our 
moral language is propositional, and that these propositions can be made true by the actual 
instantiation of moral properties that our moral claims are capable of objectivity. Harms doesn’t 
accommodate this central feature of moral realism. He seems to suggest that the propositional content 
of our moral claims is irrelevant to whether or not our moral claims are ‘true’ (in this evolutionary 
sense). I do not think that is enough for moral realism.   
My variation on Harms position is motivated by the issue of ‘moral truth’. We have seen in the 
literature under review (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) that various scholars suggest that evolved moral 
capacities do not track any moral truth (our ‘moral intuitions’ aren’t epistemically reliable). They 
distinguish this from, say, our evolved perceptual faculties which do often track truth. 
Their point is not that since something is an adaptation is cannot be epistemically reliable. Their point 
is that the kind of adaptation morality is provides us no reasons to think that it is epistemically reliable 
in the sense that our ‘moral intuitions’ track some kind of objective moral truth. Rather than tracking 
truth all that is required is that our moral capacities allowed our evolutionary ancestors to evince 
successful solutions to certain kinds of social problems of cooperation and that these capacities were 
evolutionarily advantageous. That is basically an expression of P16, and it is centrally important to the 
anti-realist position. I will now present two related problems for this view.  
Section 3: The Scientific Approach To Moral Truth 
I do not believe that evolutionary naturalists have not taken a properly scientific approach to the 
matter of morality. Here I will outline what I think a properly scientific approach would look like. In 
the next section I will suggest that failing to take this approach means that we must remain sceptics 
about P16. I will suggest, thereafter, that to avoid this sceptical result, we should adopt this scientific 
approach, and doing so will show, in some sense, that P16 is not true.  
Let me make this point by way of analogy. Suppose that the evolutionary function of our perceptual 
capacities is to represent accurately the motion and lay of the external environment. There are 
plausible reasons why such a capacity would have been adaptive. We can assess our perceptual 
capacities, knowing what their evolutionary function is, and find that they are often ‘truth-tracking’. 
That is, we do often perceive accurately the motion of certain macro-objects, we can detect barriers 
and other features of the external environment, and so on. 
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To speak about ‘perceptual truth’ is to speak about the various external physical features of our 
environment. Asking whether our perceptual faculties track any ‘perceptual truth’ is just to ask 
whether our perceptual faculties accurately represent the motion and lay of the external environment. 
Asking that question is just the same as asking whether our perceptual faculties fulfil their 
evolutionary function.  
We have various independent tests which indicate that our perceptual faculties, in this sense, do track 
perceptual truths. We can conclude that our adaptive perceptual faculties are truth-tracking. Of course, 
if our perceptual faculties rarely, or never, accurately represented the motion and lay of the external 
environment we would conclude that our perceptual faculties are not truth-tracking.  
There are two reasons why this is a legitimate method of drawing conclusions about whether or not 
our perceptual faculties track truth. Firstly, we know what the evolutionary function of our perceptual 
faculties is; or, to put it simply, we know what our perceptual faculties are ‘about’. Secondly, we have 
independent methods of testing whether our perceptual faculties currently fulfil their evolutionary 
function – we know whether or not they are, in fact, about what they are meant to be about.  
For example, we may subject the deliverances of one sense modality against that of another. If we 
think we see a fire, say, we can check whether this sighting is veridical by attempting to feel if the 
temperature in the surrounding vicinity is increased. Or, perhaps, we must see whether other objects 
(a sheet of paper, say) catch fire when put in contact with the alleged sighting, knowing that if there 
truly is fire the object should be set alight. We can also subject our observations to various 
experimental tests checking whether our observations are repeatable, or whether others also observe 
the same thing when they repeat the experiment.  
We do not theorize along similar lines, however, regarding our moral faculties and their relation to 
‘moral truth’. Anti-realists have argued that rather than tracking moral truths, our moral faculties 
tracked truths about the evolutionary benefit of certain cooperative interactive strategies. They 
conclude, on that basis, that our moral faculties don’t track any moral truths. 
But if our moral faculties have developed in order to solve certain problems of human sociality then 
the evolutionary function of our moral faculties is to provide evolutionarily beneficial solutions to the 
problems of human sociality. 
Properly speaking then, asking the question whether our moral faculties track any ‘moral truths’ is 
just the same as asking whether they fulfil their evolutionary function. We do also have independent 
tests which we can perform to see whether or not their evolutionary function is being fulfilled. Often, 
our moral faculties allow us to properly fulfil their evolutionary function. In that case, our moral 
faculties are truth-tracking. 
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This is the obvious route to take if we are asking questions about the veracity of certain evolved 
capacities for making judgments (whether they are perceptual or moral judgments). This is sufficient 
to show that we have not approached the question of morality scientifically. I say this because our 
approach to this question is not appropriately similar to the approach taken to the question of whether 
our perceptual faculties track ‘perceptual truths’.  
The general point I have tried to make by analogy is that asking whether our ‘X-faculties’ track any 
‘X- truth’ is just to ask whether our ‘X-faculties’ fulfil their evolutionary function. If we can ascertain 
the evolutionary function of our X-faculties, then we can draw conclusions about whether or not the 
X-faculty is epistemically reliable.  
The difficulty is that in the case of our ‘moral faculties’, the ‘moral truths’ which this approach would 
refer to are not ‘moral truths’ that a moral realist would ordinarily recognize. They are ‘just’ truths 
regarding certain evolutionary functions. I believe this to be a mistake, and a result of not taking a 
properly scientific approach. The scientific approach is the approach we take regarding the epistemic 
reliability of our perceptual faculties. Given that P16 is predicated on a non-scientific approach, I 
believe it to be problematic. I will continue now to detail the problem.  
Section 4: The Traditional Approach To Moral Truth 
A question I find natural to ask is why this scientific route is not taken in the literature. Answering 
that question will indicate what the second problem is. I think the main reason is that it doesn’t seem 
as if ‘morality’ as it has been thought of by moral philosophers is the same thing as ‘contingent 
solutions to problems of human sociality’. Doing what is just, say, or standing up for another person’s 
rights, just doesn’t seem like it is reducible to issues about how best to propagate the selfish genes of 
individuals, given that those individuals reside in social environments.  
I think a related reason is that, as we saw in Chapter 5, suggesting some moral perspective (say, 
Copp’s ‘society-centred theory’) can only be endorsed if it can be found to cohere with some of our 
central ‘moral intuitions’. If one proposes that morality is ‘about’ ‘how best to propagate the selfish 
genes of individuals (call it ‘selfish-gene-centred-theory’)’, insofar as this proposal fails to 
accommodate certain central ‘moral intuitions’, this proposal, from the perspective of the moral 
method, can be rejected.  
I believe that this is not the right way to approach this issue. Let me present a complex ‘tri-lemma’ for 
the anti-realists which should result in scepticism regarding P16.  
Now, typically in the literature this is how the arguments play out. Scholars generally believe on the 
basis of certain considered and central ‘moral intuitions’ that morality is not ‘about’ our selfish-genes. 
On this basis anti-realist’s support the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ do not track any ‘moral truths’, 
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and are therefore inaccurate. Realists resist this conclusion in many different ways, but their 
resistances, as we have seen, are unsuccessful mainly because they are question begging. Anti-realists, 
I believe, face a similar problem. 
Either (Option 1) anti-realists rely on some of our ‘moral intuitions’ to tell us what morality is about, 
or (Option 2) they do not. Option 1 results either in a self-undermining view that our ‘moral 
intuitions’ are not epistemically reliable, or in the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically 
reliable.  
The first result is unacceptable because it is self-undermining. The second result is question begging 
since the question at hand is whether or not our ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable. 
Assuming that they are does not demonstrate that they are. Option 1 is not open.  
Taking option 2 means that we cannot rely on our ‘moral intuitions’ in order to tell us what morality is 
about. In this case, if there is no other way of establishing what morality is about, we cannot conclude 
either that our ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable or not. I do not think that there is another 
way of establishing what morality is about from a traditional perspective.  
As we have seen in Chapter 1 the ‘moral method’ is central both to our ethical and metaethical 
theorizing. What we take to be instances of ‘morality’, what we take to be the nature of ‘morality’, 
and, therefore, what we take morality to be about appears to depend on the ‘moral method’.  
The contrived proposals I made in Chapter 5 (such as that morality is about inflicting cruelty on 
others) would not be acceptable because, as far as our ‘moral intuitions’ indicate, that is not what 
morality is about. I expect the implication of the ‘scientific approach’ I proposed above (that morality 
is ‘about’ its evolutionary function) will be resisted for similar reasons.  
The justification (as we saw in Chapter 4) for the anti-realist view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are not 
epistemically depends on some minimal account of morality in which morality is not about ‘selfish-
genes’ (or that they are about species independent, or non-natural, truths). That view relies on our 
‘moral intuitions’ as is not open if we take Option 2. If we take option 2, then, from the traditional 
perspective, we could not say what morality is about. As such, option 2 would not allow us to draw 
conclusions about whether or not our ‘moral intuitions’ were epistemically reliable. 
Anti-realists must either endorse a self-undermining view, or a question begging view, or scepticism. 
None of these options secures P16, and I suppose that the least damaging option is the option of 
scepticism. We should take Option 2. If what is in question is the veracity of our ‘moral intuitions’, 
then we cannot assume their veracity in answering that question. Unless there is another approach to 
take, we must then remain sceptical about P16.  
68 
 
The problem essentially is that the ‘moral method’ continues to be employed even when the veracity 
of the ‘moral method’ is in question. We have asked whether or not our ‘moral intuitions’ are 
epistemically reliable and we cannot presuppose their reliability in our attempts to demonstrate that 
they are or are not epistemically reliable. But if there is no other method than the ‘moral method’ we 
seem to be unable to say whether or not it is reliable.  
My suggestion is that we simply apply the same evolutionary logic that we apply to our perceptual 
faculties to our moral faculties. That, it seems, would be to take a properly scientific approach to the 
matter.  
If we take a scientific approach to the question of whether our evolved moral faculties track the moral 
truth we are asking whether our evolved moral faculties fulfil their evolutionary function. Our 
evolutionary ancestors found themselves faced with strategic problems. How should they behave, 
given their environment, so as best to survive in order to reproduce? As we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, 
the development of certain psychological capacities (those relating to happiness, pain, misery, guilt, 
joy, etc.) as well as a sense of ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’ (where fairness and justice in a social situation 
normally correspond to mutually adaptive outcomes) has been useful.  
Our moral capacities, in a general sense, are about finding solutions to these strategic problems. In a 
phrase, let me say that our moral capacities are ‘about’ our individual survival in certain social 
contexts.  
There are certainly truths regarding how best to behave in such contexts. Do our moral faculties, then, 
track these truths? They do, quite often. This is enough to suggest that our ‘moral intuitions’ are (to 
some degree, in some cases) truth-tracking. Let me now turn back to Harms proposal, and thereafter 
evaluate the prospects of this position for moral realism.  
Section 5: Non-Traditional Moral Realism 
If we can speak about an evolutionary function of some trait, then we can also speak about its 
malfunction. This gives us the minimal capacity to say when a trait is ‘correctly’, ‘properly’, or 
‘rightly’ functioning, and when it is not.  
The evolutionary function of our moral faculties is to encourage the user of such faculties toward 
behavioural strategies which will benefit their survival. If our moral faculties fail in this, then our 
moral faculties are malfunctioning. It is right, in this minimal sense, if we behave in ways which 
benefit our survival. Put differently, insofar as cooperative and altruistic behavioural strategies fulfil 
their evolutionary function, our moral faculties motivating us toward such behavior will be tracking 
certain ‘moral’ truths. 
69 
 
Our moral claims and judgments are judgments about the benefits of certain behavioural strategies. As 
we earlier saw, Harms thinks, “My statement, “you shouldn’t do that” is morally true if the issuance 
of this fulfils at least my end of the function of the moral regulatory system (Harms 2000, 707).”  
My end of the function of the ‘moral regulatory system’ (what I’ve called our ‘moral faculties’) is to 
utilize strategies in a social context which result in my benefit. Historically that has meant that one 
should utilize strategies in a social context which are properly cooperative and altruistic. Often, 
contemporarily, this means the same thing.  
The truth conditions of a moral claim are whether or not that claim fulfils its evolutionary function. A 
moral claim is true, then, if, in fact, it is directed to what would be one’s own benefit. Whether or not 
some course of action would be to ones benefit is an empirical question, the truth of which depends on 
certain objective and scientifically explicable facts. Whether or not our ‘moral intuitions’ track these 
truths is an empirical question. It seems as if our moral faculties, broadly speaking, do track these 
truths insofar as they provide us with capacities to make such judgments and embark on such courses 
of action. If this is acceptable so far, then it means that evolutionary science does not show us that our 
‘moral intuitions’ are not truth tracking, it shows us the opposite. As such, P16 is false.  
Section 6: Moral Realism and Naturalized Normativity? 
I said, in Chapter 1 that ‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed) would be like ‘moral realism’ 
(traditionally construed) except that it would not rely on the moral method. I believe that what I have 
outlined above is ‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed). What this means is that non-
traditional-moral-realism does not endorse feature 4 of traditional-moral-realism. Our epistemic 
access to moral facts is not mediated by the ‘moral method’. As we saw in Chapter 1 the ‘moral 
method’ relies on the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are, to some degree, in some cases, 
epistemically reliable.  
Non-traditional-moral-realism regards moral questions are essentially empirical questions, and our 
moral claims as empirical claims. ‘Moral intuitions’ play an epistemic role here insofar as they 
indicate to us the means to achieve certain ends pertaining to individual benefit. They are, in that 
sense, rules of thumb, which are likely to be accurate in situations which approximate those faced by 
our evolutionary ancestors. We can expect them to be epistemically useful in such cases. 
What is important, however, is not that our moral judgments in those situations comport with our 
‘moral intuitions’ about them. That would be the purport of the ‘moral method’. Rather it is that our 
‘moral intuitions’ comport with the facts about what is to our individual benefit. For that reason our 
‘more intuitions’ are dispensable. Regarding certain problems (those which are novel from the 
perspective of Pleistocene Homo sapiens), I suspect, we must dispense with them. The mark of a true 
70 
 
moral judgment is that it comports with what is to our individual benefit, whether or not those moral 
judgments are intuitive.  
 
Section 7: The Is-Ought Distinction 
Normativity, as we saw in Chapter 1, is a central feature of moral realism generally. It might seem as 
if non-traditional-moral-realism cannot provide this kind of normativity. All that non-traditional-
moral-realism countenances, after all, are descriptive statements about what benefits individuals.  
Hume noted that the following argument would be illegitimate (Wilson et al 2003, 670). 
Argument A 
P1. Cooperating with others is to our own benefit (factual premise) 
C. We ought to cooperate with others (normative claim) 
A factual statement on its own cannot be used to derive a normative statement (Wilson et al 2003, 
671) 
What is required is something like the following argument (Wilson et al 2003, 671).  
Argument B  
P1. Cooperating with others is to our own benefit (factual premise) 
P2. It is right to (we ought to) act in ways which result in our own benefit (value premise) 
C. We ought to cooperate with others (normative claim) 
It is only when a factual premise is combined with a value premise that a normative conclusion (a 
moral claim about what is right) can be derived.  
The issue, then, is that as far as it looks my proposal is reflected by Argument A, rather than 
Argument B, and my proposal therefore runs afoul of the is-ought distinction (Wilson et al 2003, 
670).  
My solution is the following. Rather than asking “what is right?” we need to ask instead, “what may 
we implore people to do?” In general, we can only implore people to do something that they have a 
reason to do. We can only say of someone that they should do A if, to them, A is the means to one of 
their ends. Evolutionary science indicates that we each ‘have a reason’ to do what it is in our own 
benefit to do.  
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Perhaps it is more correct to say that, rather than imploring people to do A, if they have a reason to do 
it, we are to point out to people that they do have a reason to do A. Getting them to do A (getting them 
to recognize that they ought to do A), then, is just a matter of describing certain implications of their 
extant ‘reasons’.  
We have seen in Chapter 2 and 3 that our evolutionary development has equipped us with various 
psychological capacities and dispositions (I’m referring to those which are pertinent to problems of 
human sociality) or ‘reasons’, some of which are motivational or inhibitory.  
What these psychological capacities are ‘about’ is our own benefit. We are predisposed to be 
motivated to act in certain ways, or for certain reasons, and motivated differently to abstain from 
certain courses of actions. These ‘certain ways’ are those strategies and courses of action, broadly 
speaking, from which our evolutionary ancestors benefited – typically pro-social, cooperative and 
altruistic.  
While ordinarily our motivations result in those kinds of behaviours, what stands behind them are 
directives which are ‘about’ our own benefits. What we may implore people to do, then, is what will 
benefit them.  
If that is correct, then, for any given individual we are warranted in saying what they ought to do 
insofar as our claim relates to how they ought to behave so as to achieve their benefit. Argument B 
can be reformulated as follows.  
Argument C 
P1. Cooperating with others is to our own benefit (factual premise) 
P2’.We have a reason to act so as to achieve our own benefit (‘value’ premise) 
C. One should to act cooperatively (normative claim).  
We are justified in telling people what they ought to do insofar as this relates to their achievement of 
their benefit. There are certain facts about how to achieve ones benefits. And so there are certain true 
statements which we can make regarding what people ought to do. 
More elaborately, ‘normative statements’ are justified, first and foremost, as statements which pertain 
to individuals in particular circumstances. What one ought to do in one situation might be different 
from what one ought to do in another situation. And these might differ from what another person 
ought to do in both situations. 
Normative statements of the familiar kind, like ‘it is wrong to steal’, are generalizations of these 
individualistic statements. ‘It is wrong to steal’ is a generalized way of saying, ‘for any individual it is 
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to their benefit if they refrain from stealing’. That is an empirical statement, and implies a certain 
prediction (namely, that no individual that steals will benefit), whether or not the statement is true, or 
to what degree it has warrant, is an empirical matter. 
The value premise in Argument B has become, essentially, a statement about psychology in Argument 
C. This psychological statement finds its justification in evolutionary science, and what that science 
tells us about the evolutionary function of our psychological adaptations.  
It plays the role of a value premise because it serves as the inference principle which allows one to 
derive a normative conclusion from a factual premise. Nevertheless, its truth is an empirical matter, 
and if nativist evolutionary psychologists are correct then we are justified in endorsing it. The 
conclusion is simply the implication of the two premises, and this is what serves as a normative 
directive – it is a statement which is action guiding. 
This is a way, then, of by-passing the ‘is-ought’ distinction. Value premises are, in some sense, factual 
premises about fundamental aspects of our psychology. The normative claims we can infer from them 
are, to that extent, empirical claims. They are, nevertheless, genuinely normative: they are action 
guiding.  
Might this fall prey to the open question problem? Even if something is to by benefit, why does that 
make it ‘good’? There are two answers to this question which I will briefly detail. The first is strong 
the second is more conservative.  
The strong answer is this. I have shown that one may justifiably say of some person P that they ought 
to commit action A in situation S. This claim is a normative claim, it is action guiding. It is capable of 
being objectively true or false. Its truth or falsity is not determined by the ‘moral method’ but by the 
empirical facts of the matter. 
In Chapter 1 I mentioned four main claims of moral realism, and said that ‘moral realism’ (non-
traditionally construed) would not rely on the ‘moral method’ (the 4th claim). The four claims were 
these.  
1. There are moral facts 
2. These facts are objective.  
3. We have epistemic access to these facts. 
4. Access is gained through the use of the ‘moral method’ 
Perhaps one might not wish to say that I had succeeded with regards to the first claim. These are not 
‘moral’ facts (they are not facts about what is ‘good’), they are just objectively true normative 
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directives. If this is the objection, then I believe it is more a linguistic issue than a substantive one. If 
non-traditional-moral-realism is correct then we can have what is important for ‘moral realism’, but 
we cannot call it ‘moral’. My first answer, then, is that perhaps this does not give us an indication of 
what is ‘good’, just simply of what we have objectively valid reasons to do. I think that is enough for 
‘moral realism’ in everything but its name.  
The second, more conservative, reply is this. The question “it is do ones benefit, but why does that 
make it good?” is calling for an intuitively acceptable answer of that ‘the good’ is. As we saw in 
Chapter 4 (Argument 1), Moore believed that there was no acceptable answer, for any given answer 
would leave a further question open. Arguably that is the result if we attempt to define ‘the good’ by 
relying on our intuitions.  
I have argued, however, that this approach is problematic and unscientific. Moore saw that it was 
problematic, but the scientific approach was not open to him. The proposal I have given is a way of 
avoiding that question begging approach in favour of a scientific approach.   
I believe I have shown that non-traditional-moral-realism avoids the is-ought problem as well as the 
open question problem. Further that it can provide genuine, and objective, normative directives.  
Section 8: Is Naturalized Moral Realism Acceptable? 
I consider non-traditional-moral-realism to be a kind of naturalized moral realism. On this account 
there are objective moral truths to which we have epistemic access. These truths are action guiding, 
they are normative.  
Recalling the definition of ‘evolutionary naturalism’ discussed in Chapter 2 this is the result of 
allowing evolutionary science to underwrite our philosophical claims. The view that morality is 
‘about’ what best benefits individual survival in social contexts is an implication of taking a properly 
scientific approach to the question. The further implications, about objective, action guiding, moral 
truths, to which we have epistemic access, are implications of that approach as well. However, I think 
that traditional moral realists will find this proposal unedifying because it does not seem as if the 
moral statements we ordinarily endorse are compatible with non-traditional-moral-realism.   
For example, it might not seem as if statements about the wrongness of murder, or the legitimacy of 
equality before the law, and so on, are reducible to barren statements about individual benefit. My 
hypothesis is that many of these statements (appropriately qualified) are so reducible. What I have 
offered, I think, is not a view substantially different from the typical one. I have offered, I think, a 
view at the most reduced level of moral statements – a view to (naturalistically construed) foundations 
of our moral claims. 
74 
 
I cannot defend these proposals adequately here. As such, they must remain hypothetical. I will say a 
few brief words in an attempt to motivate the plausibility of these proposals. My proposals may be 
regarded as a naturalistically construed version of Hobbes, or Rawls, social contract theories. Their 
theories, also, present a quite barren perspective about the foundations of our normative (political) 
claims. People are construed as ‘rationally self-interested’, in those theories (as, indeed, they are in 
Game Theory and the prisoner’s dilemma mentioned in Chapter 3). I see this as akin to the claim here 
that we are concerned, individually, with our own benefits. On my proposal, as with Hobbes and 
Rawls, it is from this barren perspective that our other more complex and familiar normative claims 
arise.  
For example, the claim that we should refrain from murder on the social contract theorists account is a 
complex claim about what rationally self-interested people agree on in order to further their 
(individual) ends. It does not seem to me so striking that similar views may be generated even if we 
construe people as motivated by dispositions, faculties, and capacities that have evolved in virtue of 
their tendency to contribute towards their own benefit in social situations.  
The significant difference between my proposals and those of Rawls and Hobbes is that my proposals 
support a kind of moral realism and theirs do not. Of course, social contract theories have their 
problems. I do not hope to saddle my proposals here with the same problems. What I want to suggest 
is just that the proposals I have offered here, barren as they may appear, need not strike us as 
unworkable for our more familiar moral purposes.  
Whether traditional moral realists find non-traditional-moral-realism acceptable probably depends on 
whether ordinarily acceptable moral claims are reducible to claims about individual benefits. Whether 
the sketch, or outline, I have given here of non-traditional-moral-realism is acceptable depends more 
so on the arguments I have presented in this chapter.  
Section 9: Closing Remarks 
I have assumed here that our moral capacities are adaptations. On that assumption I have argued that 
P16 is false. If non-traditional-moral-realism is acceptable, then I have also shown that P18 is false. 
The conclusions of Argument 4, therefore, do not follow. Further moral realism (non-traditionally 
construed) is defensible given evolutionary science and evolutionary naturalism.  
Anti-realists may defend P16 on different grounds. Perhaps they may suggest that ‘moral truths’ must 
be non-natural, or species independent, or non-contingent. If we accept that (and there are moral 
realists, as we saw in Chapter 5, who would accept this), then even on the assumption that our moral 
capacities are adaptations P16 would not be false. Whatever truths Harms and I might suggest are 
tracked by our ‘moral intuitions’ they could not, according to that view, be ‘moral’ truths. I provided 
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some arguments against this reply in Chapter 4, but they only go so far as to suggest that a moral 
realist is not required to endorse such a view (Boyd is an example of one). They are not sufficient, I 
think, to show that it is wrong altogether to view moral realism as non-naturalistic (or as 
universalistic).  
Anti-realists may then hold on to P16 in the qualified sense that our ‘moral intuitions’ do not track 
non-naturalistic or universalistic truths. I do not think that shows that non-traditional-moral-realism is 
false. It may be still that there are (quasi) moral truths which can be countenanced by evolutionary 
naturalists which our ‘moral intuitions’ do track. I suspect that these (quasi) moral truths will be 
sufficient for our moral enterprises, even if they are not non-natural or universalistic. That is, these 
(quasi) moral truths would indicate, practically, how we should behave and act in certain social 
situations. They can tell us, with objective force, what we should and should not do regarding simple 
and complex problems of social interaction. This will not be sufficient for non-naturalist, 
universalistic, concerns; but it seems like it will be sufficient for our other practical concerns.  
All of this, of course, depends on the assumption that our moral faculties are adaptations. Moral 
nativism is an empirical hypothesis about which (as we saw in Chapter 3) there is controversy. If 
moral nativism is confirmed this may render non-traditional-moral-realism more promising. If it is 
rejected, then, as I have construed non-traditional-moral-realism, it is not very promising. Further, 
without the moral nativist hypothesis there is no current reason to reject P18. Furthermore, if moral 
nativism is rejected, as I argued in Chapters 3 and 4, there may still be promise for P16, in which case 
‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed) would be rendered implausible.  
The promise held by non-traditional-moral-realism is highly dependent on the moral nativist 
hypothesis. Further, anti-realism may be plausible independently of this hypothesis, so long as 
evolutionary naturalism is not rejected. Where the truth lies in this debate then is partially an 
empirical question which can only be decided by further research. Nevertheless, if moral nativism is 
correct, then a kind of naturalized moral realism, in which all but one of the central aspects of ‘moral 
realism’ (traditionally construed) are featured, is defensible given evolutionary science and 
evolutionary naturalism.  
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Conclusion 
I have argued that ‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is probably not compatible with 
evolutionary naturalism. I have also argued that ‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed) 
probably is.  
I supported the first claim with Argument 4, reproduced below. 
P1. ‘Moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is epistemological and ontological moral 
realism. 
P2. The ‘moral method’ depends crucially on the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are, in 
some cases, and to some degree, ‘epistemically reliable’ 
C8. Moral realism (traditionally construed) is unjustified if our ‘moral intuitions’ are not 
epistemically reliable 
P16. Probably our ‘moral intuitions’ are not, to any degree, in any cases, epistemically 
reliable 
P17. Moral realism may remain plausible insofar as there is a moral methodology which 
can motivate realism without relying on the epistemic reliability of our ‘moral intuitions’.  
P18. There is no alternative methodology 
C9. Moral realism (traditionally construed) is unjustified 
C10. Moral realism (traditionally construed) is implausible 
 
I argued for the second claim by proposing objections to P16 and P18. What those objections allowed 
me to establish, on the assumption that moral nativism is correct, is that ‘moral realism’ (non-
traditionally construed) is underwritten by evolutionary science, and so is compatible with 
evolutionary naturalism.  
What that claim amounts to is that there is a version of moral realism which does not rely on the 
‘moral method’ (in which our ‘moral intuitions’ are taken to be epistemically reliable). Non-
traditional-moral-realism depends on a different kind of method which can be countenanced by 
evolutionary naturalism if moral nativism is correct.  
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An important question, then, is whether or not moral nativism is correct. This is an empirical question 
which can only be decided by further research, and its answer is therefore beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  
If moral nativism is correct then evolutionary naturalism is compatible with a kind of moral realism. I 
believe this to be a naturalized version of moral realism. While I have only given an outline of what it 
may look like, I believe that this is one way in which we might naturalize normativity.  
If moral nativism is not correct, then my argument against P16 is weakened, and my rejection of P18 
is rendered unjustified. My argument against P16 was two-fold. I firstly tried to establish that P16 is 
question begging, or self-undermining and that as such we should remain sceptics about it. On the 
assumption that moral nativism is correct, I proposed a solution to that sceptical challenge which is, 
essentially, that our moral capacities are ‘about’ our individual survival in certain social contexts. If 
that were the case, then our ‘moral intuitions’ would be epistemically reliable in certain cases because 
they would often track (‘moral’) truths about which courses of actions would be individually 
beneficial. As such, if moral nativism is not correct, I may only suggest that we should regard P16 
sceptically, and I cannot reject P18.  
I presented some reasons to suggest that moral realism does not require that moral truths are non-
contingent and universal, or that they are non-natural. These were not exhaustive reasons, however. 
Although I tried to argue against the plausibility of these options, it remains open to an anti-realist to 
argue that ‘moral truths’ must be either non-natural, or non-contingent or universal, or some 
combination thereof. If such arguments are successful, an anti-realist may endorse P16, qualifying it 
with the claim that ‘moral truth’ is non-natural, or non-contingent, or universal. As we have seen, 
there are moral realists, historically and contemporarily, who would agree with this.  
This is why I draw my two-fold conclusion. ‘Moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is probably not 
compatible with evolutionary naturalism. This is the case if moral nativism is false, and if my 
contentions regarding ‘moral truth’ are misguided. As we saw, much of my defence of ‘moral realism’ 
(traditionally construed) – that is, my rejections of Arguments 1, 2, and 3 of Chapter 4 – depends on 
the very broad view of ‘moral realism’ which I took in Chapter 2. Not everyone takes that broad view 
because different scholars do take positions on the nature of moral truth which I did not.  
My first conclusion amounts to the claim that there are many ways of construing ‘moral realism’ such 
that it will probably be incompatible with evolutionary naturalism. What I call ‘moral realism’ 
(traditionally construed) is itself a quite minimal version of moral realism, and even this minimal 
version faces quite forceful challenges from evolutionary naturalism. I maintain, then, that if moral 
nativism is false, and if my contentions regarding ‘moral truth’ are misguided, then ‘moral realism’ 
(traditionally construed) is probably not compatible with evolutionary naturalism.  
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‘Moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed) probably is compatible with evolutionary naturalism if 
moral nativism is correct and if my contentions regarding ‘moral truth’ are sound. In closing off I will 
saw a few more words for ‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed).  
I am optimistic about the prospects of ‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed). If it is correct, 
then it does seem to allow for what I take to be the most important aspects of moral realism. It would 
give us the capacity to make objectively true normative judgments about which actions, things, or 
events ought and ought not to occur. These judgments would be scientifically vindicated and could be 
believed with as much warrant as can our other scientific claims. We would not have to rely on our 
‘moral intuitions’ for insight into how we ought to behave and could then, I believe, come to have a 
more secure grasp on what is genuinely normatively required of us.  
Our moral claims would find consilience with our scientific claims. Naturalist or not, this is a virtue, 
because we have independent warrant to regard our scientific claims as correct. Currently 
‘normativity’ stands seemingly apart from our developing scientific image of the world (it is even 
‘queer’ in Mackie’s view), but if non-traditional-moral-realism is correct, this need no longer be a 
problem.  
I believe that whether traditional moral realists will find this compelling will depend partially on 
whether the program of reduction I proposed can be successfully carried out. I have tried to motivate 
an optimistic view about that by noting certain essential similarities between non-traditional-moral-
realism, and more familiar social contract theories. Nothing on the face of these proposals should 
indicate that the reduction program (of ordinarily accepted ‘moral’ claims to claims about individual 
benefits) is impossible if it has been partially demonstrated already by social contract theories and 
certain features of game theory.  
It is, ultimately, I believe, the reduction program which is the most unsettling aspect of this. It is, 
essentially, the proposal that ‘genuine normative’ claims are reducible to claims about our psychology 
and our individual homeostasis (to borrow Boyd’s term). Normative claims are, in that sense, at 
bottom complex kinds of empirical claims. These claims, of course, can be countenanced by 
naturalism, and would be underwritten by evolutionary science. But I suppose that the worry is that 
rather than providing a foundation for ‘normativity’ they indicate that there is no ‘genuine’ 
normativity at all.  
I don’t think that is the right way to look at the issue. For if ‘complex empirical claims’ can tell us 
with genuine objective force how we ought to behave, what we ought to do, and which things ought to 
happen then I am at a loss for what might be more appealing to anyone concerned about normative 
questions. If non-traditional-moral-realism is correct, then it really can achieve what we want from a 
normative theory and it does so while remaining compatible with the data of our best sciences. We 
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can even expect it to vindicate certain of our cherished ‘moral intuitions’, not only because of its 
similarity to social contract theories, but because of the scientific explanations we have for the nature 
of our ‘moral intuitions’.  
Of course, these lofty claims cannot be demonstrated here, and require further research. They also 
require that moral nativism is correct. If, however, moral nativism is correct (and if my position in 
Chapter 6 is sound) then there is, I believe, a plausible, though non-traditional, form of moral realism 
which would be compatible with evolutionary naturalism.  
In exploring the relationship between evolutionary naturalism and moral realism I have tried to get 
more clarity on what these two positions entail and how they relate to each other. One of the central 
features of this relationship, and why it is so complex, is the nature of moral methodology. If the 
moral method depends on our ‘moral intuitions’, and if there is no alternative methodology (as, 
traditionally, there is not) then evolutionary naturalism can marshal considerations which render 
moral realism implausible. If moral nativism is true, then I believe there is a possible alternative moral 
methodology which will render a non-traditional form of moral realism compatible with evolutionary 
naturalism. This non-traditional form of moral realism holds promise, and would secure the centrally 
important features of moral realism. If it cannot be justified, however, then probably moral realists 
will have to maintain some form of non-naturalism, or otherwise regard moral truths as non-
contingent and universalistic. Neither of these options seems favourable to me, and I have argued (in 
Chapters (2 and 3) and (4 and 5), respectively) against their acceptability. I conclude, then, that ‘moral 
realism’ (traditionally construed) is probably incompatible with evolutionary naturalism and that 
‘moral realism (non-traditionally construed) is, given moral nativism, probably compatible with 
evolutionary naturalism.  
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